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INTRODUCTION
All I maintain is that on this earth there are pestilences and
there are victims, and it’s up to us, so far as possible, not to
join forces with the pestilences.1
The regime of international law is illegitimate. It is a
predatory system that legitimizes, reproduces and sustains
the plunder and subordination of the Third World by the
West. Neither universality nor its promise of global order
and stability make international law a just, equitable, and
legitimate code of global governance for the Third World.
The construction and universalization of international law
were essential to the imperial expansion that subordinated
non-European peoples and societies to European conquest
and domination.2

Our generation has witnessed the unmasking of
international law and it is not necessarily a bad thing. This
unmasking process might well culminate in a “Grotian
Moment”3 of sorts, but, in the end, international law as we have
come to know it will not survive.4 The international law of today,
modern international law, is an inheritance from the age of
conquests that has gone through periodic regeneration to
1. A LBERT C AMUS, T HE PLAGUE 253–54 (1st Vintage International ed. 1991).
2. Makau Mutua, What Is TWAIL?, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 31 (2000).
3. A “Grotian Moment” has been defined as “a period in world history that seems
analogous at least to the end of European feudalism . . . when new norms, procedures,
and institutions had to be devised to cope with the then decline of the Church and the
emergence of the secular state.” BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
WORLD ORDER 1369 (3d ed. 1997). It has also been defined “as that historical time of
uncertainty and controversy when one framework of world order is being challenged by
an alternative framework.” BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD
ORDER 1269 (4th ed. 2006) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 4TH
EDITION]. See also Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L. L. 1, 18–53 (1946); Ibrahim J. Gassama, International Law at a Grotian
Moment: The Invasion of Iraq in Context, 18 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1 (2004). But for a more
restrained assessment of Grotius’ influence, see Hedley Bull, The Grotian Conception of
International Society, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 4TH EDITION, supra, at
1281, 1281–85.
4. See INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 4TH EDITION, supra note 3, at
1269 (“In our time, the resilient framework of relations among sovereign states that has
persisted since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years War is being
challenged by several contending approaches to global governance.”).
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emerge as it is today: incoherent and incompetent. It has found
sustenance in a convincing retelling of its lineage and has
nurtured exaggerated promises among those who have long
suffered under its savage embrace and who should have
rationally rejected it. Instead, these victims made pragmatic
accommodations and adopted their masters’ restatement of
history. The law that once aided conquest and domination was
thus transformed into guiding principles of a future world built
on sovereign equality, self-determination, human rights, peace,
and economic cooperation. The venerable Hersch Lauterpacht
proclaimed broadly that, “international law, which has excelled
in punctilious insistence on the respect owed by one sovereign
State to another, henceforth acknowledges the sovereignty of
man. For fundamental human rights are rights superior to the
law of the sovereign state.”5 Professor Mary Ann Glendon wrote
passionately of “a world made new,” where “the mightiest
nations on earth bowed to the demands of smaller countries for
recognition of a common standard by which the rights and
wrongs of every nation’s behavior could be measured.”6
The dispossessed generally signed on to this renewal
mission, presented as the progressive realization of law. They
often infused it with their own hopes for transformative global
change. Indeed, over the course of the decades since the Second
World War, the re-casted regime of international law did
nurture noble aspirations and inspire courageous efforts to
remake the world. Nelson Mandela and many others in the
decolonization movement testified to this.7 The decolonization
movement was matched by a spirited international commitment
to transnational institution building and frenzied standardsetting initiatives. The Genocide Convention, the United
Nations and its many agencies and affiliates, international
finance and development institutions, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (“UDHR”), and the human rights covenants,
all mark just the tip of this effort. The overarching goal was to
remind us of who we thought we were before the nastiness of
5. See HENRY STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN R IGHTS IN CONTEXT
145 (3d ed. 2008).
6. MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS xv (2001).
7. See NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK T O F REEDOM 83–84 (1994).
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unrestrained war making, slavery, genocide, ethnic cleansing,
and economic exploitation took us off course. The language of
international law was applied liberally. Some, of course, may
have cynically signed on knowing that the game had not really
changed at all and that the outcome was rigged.
The post Second World War evangelical recommitment to
international law sustained the quest for a new secular Holy
Grail, for a future in which, in Tennyson’s words, “the kindly
earth shall slumber, lapt in universal law.”8 Yet, the refurbished
regime has grown unwieldy under the weight of its
contradictions, and increasingly inconsequential in the face of
humanity’s greatest concerns and demands.9 Our common
heritage of general war making with all its attendant savagery is
as vibrant and attractive as ever. The threat of nuclear
annihilation, ironically introduced in the infancy of the new
international regime, has not receded. In fact, it poses a greater
threat to human survival and happiness today than ever.
Moreover, the persistence of human misery policed by
structured violence continues to astound. Our commitment to
material development built around exploitation of fossil fuel has
not only given us an even more unequal world, it has also given
us the new threat of catastrophic climate change. Thus, even as
devoted legions of believers in the new global regime of
international law continue to press on with happy talk, our
hopes are increasingly stressed and our faith unhinged from
everyday realities of life for much of humanity. How long can
the faithful continue to assert the reality of the enterprise called
international law in the face of persistent evidence of its
doctrinal incoherence and functional incompetence?
Not long ago, Cuban dictator Fidel Castro was asked by
members of a delegation of prominent human rights activists
why racial discrimination remained so stubbornly prevalent in
the socialist country.10 To the evident consternation of
8. ALFRED LORD TENNYSON, LOCKSLEY HALL 54 (1842).
9. See INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 4TH EDITION, supra note 3, at
1265–70.
10. See TRANSAFRICA FORUM CUBA DELEGATION, FORTY YEARS OF HOSTILITY IS
ENOUGH—CONSEQUENCES OF THE UNITED STATES’ ECONOMIC EMBARGO ON CUBA
(Mar. 1999). See generally Roberto Zurbano, For Blacks in Cuba, the Revolution Hasn’t
Begun, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/24/opinion/
sunday/for-blacks-in-cuba-the-revolution-hasnt-begun.html.
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subordinates, he admitted that his authoritarian regime had
failed to stamp out racism but not for a lack of laws and
governmental policies. With a degree of resignation, he
suggested that psychology might provide a more helpful answer
to the hardiness of racism in Cuba. Perhaps his observation has
relevance to the situation facing international law today. As
global crises, from climate change to nuclear confrontation,
endemic misery to assorted crimes against humanity, escalate,
international law theorists and activists strive to secure a role for
the regime of international law, impelled by a devotion
unjustified by history or necessity. Their fidelity is misplaced.
International lawyers and activists, looking objectively at the
critical issues facing humanity today, should come to a
conclusion that the discipline as currently conceived is not the
proper vehicle for the change the world needs now.
The simple fact that this much venerated object of faith has
not fed a single starving child, freed oppressed peoples
anywhere, stopped recurring genocide or crimes against
humanity, nor held back the oceans should engender a more
reflective perspective. Doctrine is not fate. So much energy is
being wasted trying to justify and maintain this essentially
bankrupt system. Is this being done because there is not a
reasonable alternative? Or is it because its adherents are much
too invested in the edifice? It would be more worthwhile to
embrace the radical changes that are needed and engage more
forthrightly the process of developing a new paradigm for
human relationships unfettered by tired and discredited
doctrines, processes, and faiths, all accouterments of fidelity to a
fictive narrative.
In a 2004 article on the invasion of Iraq, I asked whether
international law was on the verge of a “Grotian Moment.”11 I
wrote:
This age cries for humility. We don’t need a Grotius to tell
us that. So much has been tried and the landscape is littered
with regrets, failures, and catastrophe. But the problem was
not trying. It was the conviction. The past century offered
too many solutions and not enough questions.12

11.
12.

Gassama, supra note 3, at 30.
Id. at 50.
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In retrospect, that was a restrained assessment of the role of
international law as it saw a continuing role for the discipline,
properly refurbished. That article urged that we keep trying, an
expression of optimism that is common even among the severest
critics of international law. Such optimism is an integral part of
the heritage of progressive development of international law
catechism.13
This Article argues that modern international law in the
areas where it should matter most is dying under the weight of
doctrinal incoherence and general functional incompetence. In
other words, international law is not meeting its prime
justifications in critical areas. It is not doing what it was
supposedly refurbished to do after the Second World War and it
exists today largely in a state of disarray doctrinally and
functionally when it comes to dealing with critical problems
afflicting humanity. Further, this Article insists that international
law has not relinquished its foundational role in helping to
rationalize a global order that is characterized by a predatory
international economic system, systematic violence that
ultimately serves powerful states and interests, broad tolerance
of structured misery, as well as a general incapacity to get
nations to act in concert in the interest of humanity as a whole.
On the other hand, international law has succeeded
magnificently as the source of faith or numbing happy talk for
those who believe that we have, or could, develop the will and
expertise to do better, identify and civilize savages, and fix the
world.
To support my argument, I examine international law’s
contributions to how we deal with problems in three critical
areas of human life: avoidance of catastrophe, containment of
destructive conflicts, and promotion of decency in terms of the
reduction of global misery or structured poverty.14 Within these
13. See U.N. Charter art. 13, para. 1(a).
14. This categorization is borrowed from Richard Falk, who suggested that
international law’s capacities and limits should be tested across four broad areas: (1)
the management of complexity; (2) the containment of conflict within tolerable limits;
(3) the promotion of decency in the world; and (4) the avoidance of catastrophe. Like
the 2004 article, this one is also influenced by Professor Falk’s work. See Richard A.
Falk, The World Order Between Inter-State Law and the Law of Humanity: The Role of Civil
Society Institutions, in COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY: AN AGENDA FOR A NEW ORDER 163
(Daniele Archibugi & David Held eds., 1995) [hereinafter Falk, World Order]; see also
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categories, I look specifically at the challenges posed by climate
change, the threat of nuclear annihilation, the 2003 invasion of
Iraq, the on-going civil war in Syria, and the persistence of
misery policed by violence in much of the world as well as the
Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”) initiative designed to
address it. These case studies support the argument that an
unjustifiable importance is placed on international law as we
now conceive of it instead of accepting and confronting the
reality of international politics.
This Article builds on the Third World Approaches to
International Law (“TWAIL”)15 critique of international law
going back to luminaries like Mohammed Bedjaoui, R.P. Anand,
and Georges Abi-Saab.16 It also benefits from other critical
perspectives on the limits of international law, including Marti
Koskenniemi’s From Apology to Utopia: the Structure of International
Legal Argument,17 and David Kennedy’s The Dark Sides of Virtue.18
These critical perspectives should be distinguished from those of
positivists who actually question whether international law is
really law at all,19 or critics who argue that international law is
merely law that “emerges from states acting rationally to

RICHARD A. FALK, REVITALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW (1989) [hereinafter FALK,
REVITALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW].
15. See Mutua, supra note 2, at 31; see also Antony Anghie & B.S. Chimni, Methods
of International Law: Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual
Responsibility in Internal Conflicts, 36 STUD. IN TRANSNAT’L LEGAL POL’Y 185 (2004). See
generally SIBA N. GROVOGUI, SOVEREIGNS, QUASI-SOVEREIGNS, AND AFRICANS: RACE AND
SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 16–20 (1996); Antony Anghie, Francisco
De Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law, 5 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 321 (1996)
[hereinafter Anghie, Colonial Origins].
16. See, e.g., Mohammed Bedjaoui, No Development Without Peace, No Peace Without
Development, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND A JUST WORLD ORDER 178–83 (Richard Falk
et al. eds., 1991); R.P. ANAND, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
CONFRONTATION OR COOPERATION? (1987); Georges Abi-Saab, The Changing World
Order and the International Legal Order: The Structural Evolution of International Law Beyond
the State-Centric Model, in GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION: CHALLENGES TO THE STATE SYSTEM
439–61 (Y. Sakamoto ed., 1994).
17. MARTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989).
18. DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIANISM (2004).
19. See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 133,
201–17 (Weidenfeld & Nicholson eds., 1954); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 209
(1961). For a summary of these perspectives, see INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD
ORDER 4TH EDITION, supra note 3, at 20–67.
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maximize their interests, given their perceptions of the interests
of other states and the distribution of state power.”20 Both
positivists and the latter rational choice theorists adopt narrow
and shortsighted understanding of both the nature of law and
how people and countries define their interests. The perspective
offered here does not reject a place for law in global affairs. On
the contrary, it presumes a need for it in the classic sense of law
as sanctioned regularity, or legitimized politics of the common,
helpful, indeed essential, in varying degrees to some areas of
international life.21 Furthermore, while the criticism of the
dominant conception of law presented here does not develop a
different vision of law for the global community, such as a “law
of humanity,”22 it does not reject the possibilities for such.
I. A RESTRAINED CONCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The conception of international law that is challenged in
this Article and criticized as incoherent and functionally
incompetent is found in treaties as well as in custom.23 It is
modern international law in the various forms in which it has
been articulated and promoted since at least the end of the
Second World War: the international law of peace,
humanitarianism, human rights, sovereign equality, torture, aid,
free trade, structural adjustment, and other similarly venerated
doctrines, principles, goals, as well as the whole complex of
multinational institutions created to defend and advance them.
Thus it is the international law of the United Nations and its
principal organs, the law of the International Criminal Court
(“ICC”), the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), the
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), the World Bank, as well
as that of regional bodies such as the North American Treaty

20. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3
(2005).
21. See Burns H. Weston, The Role of Law in Promoting Peace and Violence: A Matter
of Definition, Social Values, and Individual Responsibility, in TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND
HUMAN DIGNITY 114, 116–17 (W. Michael Reisman & Burns H. Weston eds., 1976);
Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, 216 RECUEIL DES COURS
21, 21–22 (1989).
22. See Falk, World Order, supra note 14, at 163.
23. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (annexed to the U.N. Charter).
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Organization (“NATO”), the African Union, and the
Organization of American States.
There are indeed areas of human life where international
law, understood in a quite restrained sense, is making positive
contributions today. These areas include what Richard Falk has
grouped into a category called “the management of complexity.”24
In international business, for example, rules, practices, and
authoritative bodies have been developed to facilitate global
trade and diverse other cross border transactions. Thus
Microsoft, Apple, Toyota, British Petroleum, Lloyds, CNOOC,
and other global corporations are able to facilitate their interests
with the “sanctioned regularity”25 that defines any system of law.
This is also substantially true with much more modest business
interests and routine cross border transactions. International law
also plays important roles in managing expectations and
interactions across a broad swath of everyday interactions from
air travel to electronic communications to diplomatic relations.
The development of international law in these aspects has
allowed scholars to make large claims such as:
Every hour of every day ships ply the sea, planes pierce the
clouds, and artificial satellites roam outer space. Every hour
of every day communications are transmitted, goods and
services traded, and people and things transported from
one country to another . . . . And in all these respects,
international law . . . is rather well observed on the
whole . . . .26

However, even the perceived success of international law in
these areas should not be accepted uncritically. It should be
analyzed in context. It is important to recognize that a huge
number of people are excluded from or deprived of the benefits
of such transactions even as they absorb the hidden costs. Travel
and tourism, immigration, global trade and investment,
intellectual property protections, and routine diplomatic or
security activities governed by the international order are not
inherently benign and consistent with the interests of the whole
of humanity. Examples of “successful” observance of
24. See FALK, REVITALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 14, at 91.
25. See Weston, supra note 21, at 117.
26. Burns H. Weston, Law and Alternative Security: Toward a Nuclear Weapons-Free
World, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1077, 1080 (1990).

62

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 37:53

international law are also subject to the critique of functional
incompetence and doctrinal incoherence made against the
whole discipline here. The often tragic costs of these rules,
practices, and bodies are actually not well disguised and could
be easily seen in environmental devastation, massive corruption,
and misery policed by public and private violence. As such, these
successes are less about the triumph or efficacy of law than they
are about the persistence of unequal relationships and absence
of pragmatic alternatives. In any case, examples of the
“successful” operation of international law in these areas make
its failures in the critical areas discussed here all the more
revealing about its nature and limits. At a minimum, one should
ask whether liberal internationalism got carried away in the post
Second World War era with the music of its own virtues, and so
promised way more than could be delivered by a functionally
competent and coherent international legal regime under the
circumstances. A more humbling or restrained understanding of
what international law has actually accomplished and is capable
of accomplishing could free up human and material resources
from a vain quest for certitude and channel them toward the
hard politics needed to transform a violent, unstable, and
structurally unequal global structure.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
FROM CHRISTIAN IMPERIAL CONQUEST TO PAX
AMERICANA
The law of humanity is associated with the future; it is more
a matter of potentiality than of history or experience.27

Professor Richard Falk has suggested that, “the
[contemporary] notion of world order is situated between interstate law and the law of humanity, although not necessarily at all
in the middle. The inter-state is presumably the past, a time
when clearly the inter-state dimension dominated our
understanding of international law . . . .”28

27.
28.

Falk, World Order, supra note 14, at 163.
Id.
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The attitude of embracing structural changes that would rid
humanity of the stranglehold of the inter-state order would
actually be more in keeping with the traditions of early
doctrinalists and practitioners of international law like Francisco
de Vitoria and Hugo Grotius, who developed foundational
aspects of modern international law out of functional necessity.29
This attitude would also be consistent with the perspectives and
actions of the interwar and post Second World War generation
of legal intellectuals and practitioners who refused to allow a
reluctant stodgy sovereign nation state the privileging field to
shield either war criminals who claimed to have acted legally
under laws and superior orders or national leaders who wanted
the freedom to continue oppressing their citizens.30
This section briefly reviews how the dominant conception
of international law came to be. Assorted theologians, moralists,
policymakers, and lawyers, usually in the service of powerful
state or corporate interests, have chronicled the form and
substance of regimes of order, inequality, violent subjugation,
and plunder since at least the Fifteenth Century. Dutch jurist
Hugo Grotius’ much celebrated De Jure Belli ac Pacis 31 was
essentially a restatement of practices that had evolved from
antiquity that he cautiously recommended to fretful sovereigns
of a later age busy with savage domination of an expanded world
and desperate to accumulate resources for ongoing conflicts.
Grotius, dubbed Father of international law, meticulously built
on earlier surveys and commentaries by other European
Christian theologians and jurists like Vasquez, Vitoria, Ayala,
and Suárez to argue for a more orderly process.32 The “law”
elaborated by these agents of empire should be understood as a
useful set of signals, or guidelines to both the weak and the
powerful on how to behave either to preserve their advantages
and prosperity or just simply survive under the circumstances.

29. See Anghie, Colonial Origins, supra note 15.
30. See Thane Rosenbaum, Essay, The Romance of Nuremberg and the Tease of Moral
Justice, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1731 (2006). See generally TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG
TRIALS: WAR CRIMES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1949).
31. See HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE (1901).
32. See Sergio Moratiel Villa, The Philosophy of International Law: Suárez, Grotius and
Epigones, 37 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 539 (1997).
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Necessity has often been the springboard for creative
change in transnational human relations for good or ill. If we
consider the international law of the present as the direct
descendant of the regime that began in the late Fifteenth
Century with “discovery,” and the savage conquest of “lesser”
others in a supposed new world, we could identify at least four
subsequent critical periods in which doctrines and policies
governing “transnational” relations have had to be adjusted to
solve practical problems and maintain the relevance if not the
coherence of the regime. Much could be learned from this
history as we contemplate the possibilities of a future in which
the interests of humanity, not those of the inter-state order of
the last several centuries, will be paramount.
In the first of these critical periods, a sort of pre-Grotius
“Grotian Moment,” circa 1492, the basic problem facing the
progenitors of modern international law was how to divide the
spoils of conquest and new world colonialism between the
imperial powers, Spain and Portugal. This was resolved, at least
temporarily, by appeal to Christian imperialism under the
authority of the Pope.33 Pope Alexander VI issued two papal
bulls in 1493 that divided the new world between the two
Western superpowers of the time, Spain and Portugal, in the
interest of Christianity. The two powers entered into other
treaties built on this papal law foundation. This Christian
imperialism-based order of international relations persisted
within the spheres of European influence until other European
rulers challenged it from outside divine law to further their
particular interests. These challenges led to another critical
moment.
As more European powers joined in the business of
plunder outside their home continent, they rejected the
authority of the Pope both as arbiter of inter-sovereign relations
as well as relations between European sovereigns and native
people in other continents. This challenge opened up space for
a more secular approach to resolving disputes among European
sovereigns as well as disputes between them and non-Europeans.
Francisco de Vitoria, a Spanish jurist, helped to fashion a rulesbased process of resolving these disputes. As Professor Antony
33.

GROVOGUI, supra note 15, at 16–20.

2013]

INCOHERENCE AND INCOMPETENCE

65

Anghie puts it, Vitoria rejected “old medieval jurisprudence”
that gave primacy to the Pope, and replaced it with a more
secular version based on natural law administered by sovereign
rulers.34 Vitoria saw “the problem [as one] of creating a system
of law which could be used to account for relations between
societies which he understood to belong to two very different
cultural orders . . . .”35 This legal resolution paved the way for
the complete domination of native people in the New World
dictated primarily by secular material interests of European
powers. It gave the various European powers the freedom to
pursue their expanded national interests while they nurtured
rules that formed the basis for the present inter-state legal order.
Hugo Grotius, a loyal subject of Dutch power and lawyer for
the Dutch East India Company, did not enter the picture until
several decades after this foundation.36 He focused on how to
restrain the continuing destructive competition and conflicts
among the growing number of European potentates attracted to
conquest and pillage in far away societies.37 It is noteworthy that
many accounts of modern international law’s origins focus on
narrower and more benign interpretations of Grotius work,
ignoring not only its indebtedness to Vitoria but also its essential
facilitation and rationalization of European as well as royal
supremacy.38 Grotius’ contributions were largely derivative of
Vitoria’s. He reaffirmed Vitoria’s secular foundations of an intersovereign or international law. He sanctified the development of
principles of sovereign equality among European nations in
order to reduce the destructive consequences of war. He also

34. See Anghie, Colonial Origins, supra note 15, at 322.
35. Id.
36. Hugo Grotius (1583–1645). There were of course many others who preceded
Grotius and wrote seriously about what we now call international law, including the
Spaniards Vásquez de Menchaca (1509–1566), Balthazar Ayala (1548–1584), and
Francisco Suárez (1548–1617). Another important figure in the development of
international law in that era was the Italian jurist, Albericus Gentilis (1552–1608).
37. See GROTIUS, supra note 31.
38. See Lauterpacht, supra note 3, at 18–53. Lauterpacht argued that
“notwithstanding shortcomings of method and defects of substance . . . the principal
and characteristic features of De Jure Belli ac Pacis are identical with the fundamental
and persistent problems of international law.” Id. at 18–19. One may accept this
observation while disagreeing with the post Second World War assertion that
international law has substantially broken off from its state interest anchor. Desire is
not a substitute for reality and does not trump experience.
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helped to heal fractured European imperialism and to make the
process of colonial domination by Europe of outside peoples
more orderly, more efficient, and more permanent. Grotius’
arguments in defense of freedom of the seas were similarly
oriented. Grotius argued for humanity and decency as
consistent with the interests of imperial sovereigns and their
nascent European nation states. It would be truly an
exaggeration to suggest that Grotius foresaw a future in which
the interests of the sovereign would be subordinate to those of
individuals.
Another critical moment in the development of rules of
conduct among European nations occurred in the mid-to-late
Nineteenth Century and served to refine the processes and
substance of European imperialism and colonial domination of
non-Europeans through international law. This is the period
generally referred to as the Scramble for Africa, a process by
which European colonialism, now broadened to include once
marginal players such as Germany, Italy, and Belgium, devised
rules to make the European partition and pillage of Africa more
orderly and thus more profitable for the Europeans.39 By this
time, European powers had jettisoned Christian imperial
rationalization or divine law for conquest and plunder. A newer
foundation built on “humanitarian” ideas of spreading
civilization, the suppression of savagery, promoting free trade,
and such was now deployed.40 The scramble for Africa occurred
in conjunction with the ongoing race to dominate much of the
rest of the world outside Europe. This is also the period in which
39. See generally THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA: THE WHITE
MAN’S CONQUEST OF THE DARK CONTINENT FROM 1876 TO 1912 (1991). “The Scramble
for Africa is one of the most extraordinary phenomena in history. In 1880 most of the
continent was still ruled by its inhabitants and was barely explored. Yet, by 1902, five
European powers—Britain, France, Germany, Belgium and Italy—had grabbed almost
all of its ten million square miles, awarding themselves thirty new colonies and
protectorates, and 110 million bewildered new subjects.” From the Publisher,
http://204.93.202.168/our-book-blogs/945-the-scramble-for-africa-theZENOSBOOK,
white-mans-conquest-ofthe-dark-continent-from-1876-to-1912-by-thomas-pakenham.
html (last visited Nov. 20, 2012) (describing PAKENHAM, supra).
40. As David Livingstone stated at his Cambridge University address on
December 5, 1857, “I beg to direct your attention to Africa; I know that in a few years I
shall be cut off in that country, which is now open: Do not let it be shut again! I go back
to Africa to try to make an open path for commerce and Christianity . . . .” See
PAKENHAM, supra note 39, at 1 (quoting Livinston’s address). See generally ADAM
HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST (1998).
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a new more powerful player, the United States, emerged into
the broader world stage to extend its own unique concept of the
civilizing mission, or manifest destiny throughout the Americas
and into Asia.41 The United States provoked a war against Spain
in 1898, several decades after a similarly manufactured casus belli
with Mexico, to herald the beginning of its own expansion
outside of the Americas into Asia.42 It was perhaps fitting that
Spain, the once great imperial power that initiated the process
of global conquest by European powers, met its demise through
an unimagined consequence of its quest. Centuries of efforts to
create an international law to regulate the process of conquest
and domination did not protect its spoils from the desires of a
greater power.
The most recent moment has given us our present version
of international law, the specific regime of conquest and
exploitation under which we are still muddling and in which the
United States remains the dominant force in the world
community. The end of the Second World War gave the United
States extraordinary ideological and material advantages. The
desire to secure these advantages encouraged it to recast western
history and power under an overarching vision of a Pax
Americana, an American-supervised world order bathed, yet
again, in the language of international law.43 Post-war US
dominance allowed it to claim the old European mantle of
civilization’s vicar and to try to rehabilitate the discredited
memory of past civilizing missions. US economic and military
supremacy in the post Second World War world gave critical
ideological and programmatic dominance to its interpretation
and management of critical aspects of international relations.44
This includes not only the use of force, human rights,
41. See HAROLD EVANS, THE AMERICAN CENTURY 48–67 (1998). Mark Twain
satirized the pretensions and unmasked the true agenda of the period: “I bring you the
stately nation named Christendom, returning bedraggled, besmirched, dishonored,
from pirate raids in Kiaochou, Manchuria, South Africa, and the Philippines, with her
soul full of meanness, her pocket full of boodle, and her mouth full of pious
hypocrisies. Give her soap and a towel, but hide the looking glass.” Id. at 50 (quoting
MARK TWAIN, GREETINGS FROM THE NINETEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
(1990)); see also DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 303–21 (1998).
42. See EVANS, supra note 41, at 62–63.
43. See id. at 386–403.
44. Id; see also DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 120–77
(1990).
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decolonization, and international trade, but also, crucially, how
we remember the past. Pax Americana recognizes that it should
separate its processes from the past in order to justify them. The
ideology of international law is a crucial aspect of this
recognition.
Expanded participation by non-state actors in the
development of international legal doctrines, processes, and
programs has been a key strategy in reconstituting the vision of
international law in this period of Pax Americana. The
international law of this moment also emphasizes recognition of
the individual as both a subject and object of international law,
as well as renewed commitment to global economic and cultural
cooperation. This is the lure of progressive realization, the
golden object that entices liberal internationalists of all sorts,
from human rights campaigners and international criminal law
fetishists to good governance and development world travelers,
to abide the dissonance in the world and keep striving for
something better.
The embrace of this post-war Pax Americana vision of
international law was so broad and deep that the Cold War
never seriously challenged its influence. Even those who fought
Western hegemony had to claim adherence to this vision in
form and substance in order to advance their particular
concerns or simply to be tolerated. Algerian jurist Mohammed
Bedjaoui, for example, spoke of a “heavily darkened
international horizon,” and about “distress for some, anxiety for
others, and destitution for most” in his seminal address, “No
Development
Without
Peace,
No
Peace
Without
Development.”45 Yet, his prescriptions for change fell well within
the existing liberal international order. It was a call for dialogue,
for reform, and not a radical restructuring of the international
order.46 The broader decolonization and economic selfdetermination movements eventually succumbed because at
their core, they were creations of the moment.
It is the case that states gave up important elements of
sovereign power to join the United Nations and other
transnational institutions underpinning the post-war global
45.
46.

See Bedjaoui, supra note 16, at 178.
Id. at 178–83.
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order. States have also yielded to a multitude of international
agreements that seek to restrain state power and enhance the
freedoms of non-state actors. Witness the manner in which the
ad-hoc international criminal tribunals and the International
Criminal Court have been embraced by the very actors who are
most likely to be impacted negatively by its operation. Note also
the significant devolution of state economic power to the World
Bank, the IMF, and the adjudicative panels of the WTO.
However, in reality, it is the weakest of the states that have had
to make substantive concessions. As far as the more powerful
states are concerned, these commitments remain entirely
subject to how they perceive their national imperatives. The
United States had no legal difficulty torturing international
terror suspects, China is still in Tibet, Russia’s war against
separatists remain outside international legal supervision, India,
Pakistan, Israel have illegally developed nuclear weapons, and
Iran moves toward developing the same. A major incentive for
some of those who support this refurbished vision of
international law has been the belief that it is the best hope for
humanity, and that a commitment to hope backed by a common
acceptance of a strategy of progressive realization gave them a
better chance of remaking the savage world they had inherited.
But it is time to ask in the manner of the poet whether:
Hope was ever on her mountain, watching
till the day begun—
Crown’d with sunlight—over darkness—
from the still unrisen sun.47

Truly, what has changed? Have the post war limitations of
state power, the growth of international institutions, the
entrance of new subjects of international law, the promotion of
international criminal accountability, really challenged the
status quo that old international law helped to defend? What
good were the limitations of UN doctrine of jus ad bellum when
the United States under President Bush wanted to go to war
against Iraq? Did the Convention against Torture form an
actionable barrier to torture in the US War on Terror? What
role has the opinion of the International Court of Justice on the
nuclear weapons possession and use played on the growing
47.

ALFRED LORD TENNYSON, LOCKSLEY HALL SIXTY YEARS AFTER 465 (1886).
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threat of nuclear catastrophe? Is the International Criminal
Court engaged in promoting justice or re-affirming that savagery
is essentially the province of the dispossessed? Was the turn to
MDGs not a reaffirmation that global inequality and misery are
outside law and subject to the generosity or lack thereof of the
haves?
In terms of its rhetoric and promises, the international law
that emanated from the post Second World War’s “Grotian
Moment” of history was actually a radical restatement of how
international law had long functioned. What used to be a
modest, slowly evolving and indeed rather restrained effort to
get first Christian, later secular powers, to play nice with each
other was reinterpreted to justify a full blown assault on global
disorder in an American-led campaign to create a new world
order that would have provoked envy from Alexander the Great
or Julius Caesar. The deliberate strategic decision by Americanled allied powers to cast the decisive defeat of their Second
World War enemies in timeless moral language, elevated and
sanctioned by multinational institutions and legal proceedings,
was an audacious success. It erased enormous inconvenient
chapters of their own histories. Even the most outrageous
behavior only a few decades old, such as the European partition
and colonization of Africa or the conquest of Spain’s former
colonies by the United States seemed cleansed by this recasting
of the victors as defenders of a timeless secular faith backed by
law. Furthermore, exaggerated assertions of actually quite
incoherent and indeterminate principles in a brave new world of
supposed sovereign equality covered up tragic realities such as
that there were more-than-equal members of the UN Security
Council with vetoes, that a few more-than-equal states possessed
nuclear weapons, that a tiny number of more-than-equal states
possessed the might to intervene militarily and subvert
unfriendly regimes, and that a few more-than-equal states
controlled the international economic order.
The establishment of the international human rights
movement was perhaps the greatest innovation of the post war
liberal international world orderists. The movement franchised
the creation of a new world order, enlisting citizen idealists in
the center and periphery of imperialism in the spread of the
new joyful ideology of Western supremacy. Civil society was thus
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co-opted as humanitarian imperialists to continue the tradition
of civilizing missions to suppress native savagery in far off places.
Core justifications such as the primacy of the right to selfdetermination of peoples ignored the inconvenient truth that
the resulting states were often the deadliest threat faced by their
citizens and that in any case, oppressed peoples often have to
keep fighting terrible wars against other peoples to keep their
supposed birthright. The movement also unwittingly conspired
to normalize the unspeakable horror of everyday misery by
relegating economic, social, and development imperatives to
mere aspirations.
The spectacular embrace of this new post Second World
War iteration of international law is reflected in the
innumerable international agreements, ceaseless gatherings,
and a multitude of international bodies that serve to secure the
privileges of the powerful, while devising more roles and
opportunities in the international order for self-righteous
international bureaucrats and aspiring do-gooders whose
necessary supervisory work will, of course, never end.
A. Incoherence and Functional Incompetence
Liberal critics of international law have generally reconciled
themselves into two camps: the pragmatic reformers, who persist
with the next law suit, aid project, initiative, conference,
guidelines, protocols, convention, or demand for humanitarian
interventions, and the “Grotian Moment” theorists, who watch
eagerly for the next great crisis that would open our eyes to the
need and possibilities of fundamental change that would finally
give us the international law promised to us by someone or
something (nature, self or collective interest).48 Both camps are
seriously mistaken. Reviewing the history of international law’s
development, going back to 1492, it is clear that international
law has not justified such a privileged position. Perhaps nothing
should be that privileged. For one thing, international law has
not been shorn of it historic function to define, interpret, and
implement the rules for domination and submission among

48. These “internal” critics should be distinguished from those who deny the
existence of international law or reduce it to an appendage of international politics.
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organized groups of humans, presently constituted at least
formally as states or nations.49
Why persist with this charade? Why not admit the doctrinal
incoherence and functional incompetence of post Second
World War international law, and embrace, even hasten, its
demise? Why engage in rhetorical excesses like “the mightiest
nations on earth bowed to the demands of smaller countries for
recognition of a common standard by which rights and wrongs
of every nation’s behavior could be measured?”50 Some of this
reflects the enduring pull of utopianism, or the vanity that
allows some to persist with the myth of enduring solutions that
only law could provide to the living. Undoubtedly, there is also
credible fear that something terrible or worse may develop in a
vacuum unfilled by a vision of law no matter how fragile. But do
we need international law to tell us that genocide and crimes
against humanity are bad? Does the regime prevent more
genocide and crimes against humanity? Without international
law would we have more wars than what we have had? Is it
international law that is keeping more people from joining the
ranks of those surviving on less than a dollar a day? Would we be
more destructive of the environment or more oppressive to
women and disfavored minorities without international law? In
truth, what does international law have to do with anything that
is of vital importance to humanity as a whole today? This Article
examines the threat of nuclear annihilation, destructive conflicts
in the Middle East, and globalized misery to illustrate the
incoherence and inconsequence of international law to how we
struggle with these critical issues.
B. Avoiding Catastrophe
In the Twenty-first Century, humanity will likely burn out in
a nuclear holocaust or fade away amid the gradually
mounting effects of climate change. That was Noam
Chomsky’s prediction during a question-and-answer session
in 2009 that still resonates today. By moving forward with a
49. See generally GROVOGUI, supra note 15, at 16–20; Anghie, Colonial Origins, supra
note 15, at 321–36.
50. GLENDON, supra note 6, at xv.
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missile defense policy that upsets the balance of nuclear
deterrence with Russia, “we’re consciously increasing the
threat of nuclear war,” Chomsky said. As for the effects of
climate change, “nobody knows the exact details, but
everybody knows that the longer you wait, the worse it’s
going to be.”51

1. Climate Change
Already, glaciers are melting, heat waves and heavy rains are
increasing, the food system is under stress and the sea is
rising. The best that can be hoped for, scientists say, is to
limit the damage slow enough to provide society more time
to adjust.52

There is solid international consensus today on the threat
posed to humanity by global warming and climate change and
considerable efforts have been made by diverse collection of
people across to the world to meet the challenges.53 There is
clear understanding today that efforts to deal with this urgent
threat to communities around the world should involve
everyone, and should be coordinated across the world. This is
not a problem that any one nation can fix, no matter how
powerful or committed. As such, the United Nations has become
a critical forum for encouraging, supporting, and coordinating
initiatives to deal with climate change. With a matter of this
51. Noam Chomsky, Address to On The Earth Productions and The Nation: If
Nuclear War Doesn’t Get Us, Climate Change Will (Mar. 28, 2013), available at
http://www.thenation.com/video/173205/noam-chomsky-if-nuclear-war-doesnt-get-usclimate-change-will.
52. Justin Gillis, Obama Puts Legacy at Stake With Clean Air Act, N.Y. TIMES, June 25,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/science/earth/clean-air-act-reinterpreted
-would-focus-on-flexibility-and-state-level-efforts.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
53. See Ruth Gordon, Climate Change and the Poorest Nations: Further Reflections on
Global Inequality, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1559, 1623–24 (2007). Gordon highlights the
particular vulnerability of poorer nations to climate change and its consequences. She
concludes that the economic interests of the most powerful nation will prevent action
on this issue “until the consequences become intolerable.” Id. at 1623. She adds that
“the peoples of small island nations, the lowest income nations, and the inhabitants of
rapidly deteriorating habitats such as the Arctic region have no voice in this scenario
and will suffer until it is in the interests of the powerful to take a different path.” Id.
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urgency and with undeniable recognition of the need to take
immediate and extraordinary steps to mitigate and arrest the
slide toward devastating consequences for humanity, one would
expect that the machinery of international legality would be at
its best. This has not been the case. While so much of the efforts
have gone toward employing international law as the foundation
for legitimate and efficacious action, the reality is that
international law, in any sense, has been a sideshow. The fitful
movements that have occurred have been without regard to
international law. With regard to climate change, international
law, whether of the traditional sort or the post Second World
War variety, has not been a significant contributor in any
substantive sense. The realities of international politics have
prevailed.
An examination of the journey toward global consensus on
climate change illustrates brightly the very limited capacity of
international law on this matter of utmost importance. Several
decades of warnings from scientists and others beginning in the
1960s about increasing concentrations of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere and related steady increases in global temperatures
eventually nudged an international response to the problem.
The first World Climate Conference took place in 1979. The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”), whose
reports have been critical to subsequent international responses
to climate change, was set up in 1988.54 The first global legal
response to the developing crisis was the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), adopted at the
Earth Summit in 1992.55 That document, although consciously
limited in its legal capacity, provided a foundation upon which
international legal action could be taken.56 It acknowledged
54. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) was established
in 1988 jointly by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nation
Environmental Programme (“UNEP”). Organization, INTERNGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml#.UlroCm
R4ZDE (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
55. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992,
1771 U.N.T.S. 107, 165, 31 I.L.M. 849 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. The Convention has 195
Parties. Id.
56. The UNFCCC includes a broad list of commitments. These commitments
employed non-binding but exhortatory language, such as “develop,” “formulate,”
“promote,” “cooperate,” and “communicate” to encourage individual state and
collective actions to mitigate climate change without any hint of sanctions. Id. art. 4.
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“that change in the Earth’s climate and its adverse effects are a
common concern of human kind.”57 Its contributions as a
document of collective understanding of the problem, an
affirmation of the necessity for urgent action, and a source for
the best practices in responding to this impending calamity
should be appreciated.58 Yet, it is not a source of law or binding
obligations.59 Worse, its efforts to masquerade as such diminish
the meaning and value of law. In this manner, it continues a
tradition in the modern era that goes back to the UDHR and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. Of course, the value of such instruments as vehicles for
enterprising academics and activists to squeeze notions of
binding obligations useful only in theoretical discourse is not in
dispute here. That is not a sufficient reason, however, to
mischaracterize the reality of international politics, and the
quite limited reach and capacity of international law.
The Kyoto Protocol (the “Protocol”) was developed later to
operationalize the UNFCCC.60 Although adopted in 1997, it did
not enter into force until 2005. The United States signed the
Protocol but in the face of broad-based hostility in the United
States Senate, it has not been presented for ratification.61 Many

The document affirms the collective understanding of the problem and catalogues best
practices in the service of a global priority. Id.
57. See id. pmbl.
58. Id. art. 2. The UNFCC explicity states that:
The ultimate objective of the Convention and any related legal instruments
that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with
the relevant provisions of the convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be
achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystem to adapt naturally
to climate change, to ensure food production is not threatened and
economic development to proceed in a sustainable way.
Id.
59. The Convention’s dispute settlement provisions generally leave it to the
parties to decide how to settle disputes that may arise among them “concerning the
interpretation or application of the convention.” Id. art. 14(1). However, parties are
given the option of making provisions of the convention binding and to choose the
International Court of Justice or international arbitration for resolution. Id. art. 14(2).
60. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, UN Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22. The Protocol
has 191 parties as of 2013.
61. According to a news report:
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US leaders were upset that China and India had been among
those countries not required to make commitments.62 Further
Canada, Japan, and Russia have either withdrawn their support
of the Protocol or limited their participation in its targets.63 The
Protocol too fell short as a legal document although its
contributions as a global call for specific actions to mitigate
climate change should not be minimized. The Protocol
reaffirmed the ultimate objective contained in article 2 of the
UNFCCC, and employed the same weak dispute resolution
process contained in the Convention. The Protocol was
supposed to go beyond the efforts of the Convention to legally
bind developed countries to emission reduction targets within
specific time periods. The Protocol, employing the principle of
“common but differentiated responsibility,” sets binding
emission targets only for thirty-seven industrialized countries
and the European community in its first commitment period
ending 2012. This principle of common but differentiated
responsibility “recognizes that they [industrialized nations] are
largely responsible for the current high levels of greenhouse gas
emissions in the atmosphere, which are the results of 150 years
of industrial activity.”64
As the first commitment period of the Protocol came to a
close, Parties gathered in Doha, Qatar in December 2012 to
assess progress and map future efforts. The Doha meeting was
compromised by several factors including the general lack of
significant progress toward mitigation even by those parties that

Sen. Larry E. Craig (Idaho), head of the Republican Policy Committee, told
reporters here that the treaty is “designed to give some nations a free ride, it
is designed to raise energy prices in the United States and it is designed to
perpetuate a new U.N. bureaucracy to manage global resource allocation.” It
also would undermine the recent reform of farm programs and threaten U.S.
agricultural production, warned Sen. Pat Roberts (R-Kan.).
Helen Dewar & Kevin Sullivan, Senate Republicans Call Kyoto Pact Dead, WASH. POST,
Dec. 11, 1997, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/climate/
stories/clim121197b.htm.
62. See id.
63. Regan Doherty & Barbara Lewis, Doha Climate Talks Throw a Lifeline to Kyoto
Protocol, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2012, 2:44 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/
08/us-climate-talks-idUSBRE8B60QU20121208.
64. See Making Those First Steps Count: An Introduction to the Kyoto Protocol, U.N.
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_
background/kyoto_protocol/items/6034txt.php.
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had made commitments, the failure of the United States to ratify
the agreement, and the withdrawal of commitments by Russia,
Japan, New Zealand, and Canada. Added to this was the
outstanding dispute over the failure to require commitments
from two rapidly industrializing powerhouses, China and India.
As one observer put it, “overall, the result is that global
emissions have showed no sign of slowing down . . . . In that
sense, the Kyoto protocol has been a failure. But it was
unquestionably an important first step in global climate
diplomacy.”65
In Doha, Parties to the Protocol decided to push difficult
decisions about how to deal with climate change to the future.
They agreed to extend the Protocol until 2020. According to
one assessment, Kyoto was “sapped by the withdrawal of Russia,
Japan, and Canada and its remaining backers, led by the
European Union and Australia, now account for just 15 percent
of world greenhouse gas emissions.”66 Another observer at the
talks states that, “there’s a huge disconnect between the urgency
on the outside and what happens here.”67
The results of the conclaves in Doha and Kyoto, and all the
numerous other gatherings and initiatives to deal with the
challenges posed by this threat to human survival suggest the
foundational weaknesses in international politics focused
through a lens of international legality. When it comes to
dealing with matters that could require the most powerful
nations to sacrifice even a little of their national advantages, no
matter how temporary or ephemeral in the long run, law as law
finds little support.68 The tragedy of our collective impotence is
65. Duncan Clark, Has the Kyoto Protocol Made Any Difference to Carbon Emissions?,
Environment, GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2012, 5:39 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
environment/blog/2012/nov/26/kyoto-protocol-carbon-emissions.
66. Doherty & Lewis, supra note 63.
67. Id. (quoting Jennifer Haverkamp, of the Environmental Defense Fund).
68. John Vidal captures the reality of global climate change politics:
Evidence of global warming mounts both on the ground and in science, but
in the bubble world of international climate diplomacy, little happens.
Countries have become less and less able to collectively address the crisis
unfolding around them. When UN talks fell apart in Copenhagen in 2009,
world leaders claimed they could cobble together a new binding agreement
to cut emissions within six months. That became a year, then two years, and
now the rich countries tell a bemused public that it will be 2015 at the earliest
before a final agreement will be reached. Trillions of dollars can be found to
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compounded when we rush to attach the language of law to
even the most modest of accomplishments. Calling it soft law in
such instances merely signals uncreative desperation. As we see
with regard to Kyoto, the more likely substantive outcome is a
breakdown in communication and cooperation as nations
devote substantial energy to ensure that they are not giving up
their capacities to act consistent with their national interests in
the future. Whatever progress one can discern with regard to
climate change mitigation, it has had nothing to do with law. If
anything legalism has been a hindrance. We cannot escape
politics by intoning law, especially when it affects nations with
sufficient power and influence. On the other hand, one can
credit the international political process with spurring diverse
creative domestic and cooperative international efforts to deal
with climate change.69 These efforts are not occurring because
of the threats posed by some sort of international sanctions. The
role of international work in this arena has been to develop the
science, communicate urgency, and build consensus on the best
mitigation practices. It would be ironic if climate change, a
global crisis that requires the powerful to give up something and
a crisis that could not be solved by simply taking more from the
weak, ends up highlighting the overreach of international law
on other issues.
2. Nuclear Annihilation
The General Assembly, . . .
1. Declares that: . . .
(c) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is a war
directed not against an enemy or enemies alone but also
against mankind in general . . .

bail out banks in a few months, but the world’s most experienced negotiators
cannot find a way to get Americans, the British or anyone to just turn down
the air conditioning or lag their roofs to reduce the amount of energy they
use.
John Vidal, Time Is Running Out: The Doha Climate Talks Must Put an End to Excuses,
GUARDIAN, Nov. 25, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/nov/
25/doha-climate-talks-end-to-excuses.
69. The president’s 2013 initiatives on climate change focus on what was
achievable within domestic United States political structure. See, e.g., Gillis, supra note
52.
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(d) Any State using nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is
to be considered as violating the Charter of the United
Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as
committing a crime against mankind and civilization.70
Nevertheless, the Court considers that it does not have
sufficient elements to enable it to conclude with certainty
that the use of nuclear weapons would necessarily be at
variance with principles and rules of law applicable in
armed conflict in any circumstance.71

Just over a decade ago, US President George W. Bush and
his top advisers built a case for war against Iraq by emphasizing
the threat of weapons of mass destruction (“WMD”), especially
nuclear weapons, under the control of a “rogue” regime or
terrorists.72 Despite substantial resistance from much of the
world, the invasion of Iraq proceeded.73 Eventually, it was
conceded that the WMD fears in that particular instance were at
best exaggerated or worse, entirely fabricated74 This conclusion
has hardly impacted US power and prestige in the world. On the
contrary, the coalition that prosecuted a war, justified
erroneously or maliciously by fears of WMD, is being reassembled to go to war again over nuclear weapons. President
Barack Obama recently stated that Iran was proceeding with the
development of nuclear weaponry against the wishes of the
international community. He claimed that Iran was just over one
year away from developing nuclear weapons capabilities and
70. Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear
Weapons, G.A. Res. 1653 (XVI), at 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1653 (XVI) (Nov. 24, 1961).
71. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, at 262–63 (July 8).
72. President George W. Bush, Address on the Start of the War in Iraq (Mar. 19,
2003), available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/20/iraq.georgebush
(“Our nation enters this conflict reluctantly, yet our purpose is sure. The people of the
United States and our friends and allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime
that threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder.”); see also Top Bush Officials Push
Case Aginst Saddam, CNN (Sept. 8, 2002, 8:46 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2002/
ALLPOLITICS/09/08/iraq.debate.
73. See Ewen MacAskill & Julian Borger, The Iraq War Was Illegal and Breached UN
Charter, Says Annan, GUARDIAN, (Sept. 15, 2004, 9:28 PM), http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq.
74. See Hans Blix, Iraq War Was a Terrible Mistake and Violation of U.N. Charter,
CNN (Mar. 19, 2013, 4:36 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/18/opinion/iraq-warhans-blix/index.html.
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reaffirmed the US commitment to using whatever means to
deny Iran such capabilities.75
Whether or not the United States alone, or in conjunction
with other nations, eventually prosecutes war with Iran over
Iran’s supposed desire or efforts to develop nuclear weapons,
the expectations that international law could help discipline the
possession or use of nuclear weapons have not been met.
Professor Nanda’s work on nuclear weapons and human security
captures the long and frustrating international efforts to gain
control over this clear threat to humanity.76 Those efforts began
in 1946, not long after the tragic demonstration of the weapon’s
potential for massive destruction. Since that time, calls for
elimination of nuclear weapons have persisted and multiplied.77
The “commitment of the international community to the goal of
the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the creation of a
nuclear-weapon-free world” has been a standard expression of
this endeavor.78
The heart of international law’s contribution to a nuclearfree world has been the 1968 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (“NPT”).79 In essence, the NPT proposed a
grand bargain between what may be termed the haves and havenots of the atomic age.80 In sum, the haves agreed to retain their
weapons until they should agree in the future, after
negotiations, to disarm. In the meantime, they promised to
share any potential benefits of nuclear technology, except for
the deadly aspects, with the have-nots. In turn, the have-nots
agree to limit themselves only to peaceful applications of
nuclear technology and not to obtain nuclear weapons
technology or weaponry. It is important to note that no party in
possession of nuclear weapons offered to destroy their cache or
put it under international control. Instead, the great hope for
75. See Michael D. Shear & David E. Sanger, Iran Nuclear Weapons to Take Year or
More, Obama Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/15/
world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-weapon-to-take-year-or-more-obama-says.html.
76. See Ved P. Nanda, Nuclear Weapons, Human Security and International Law, 37
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 331 (2009).
77. See id. at 337.
78. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 52/38 L, 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/38 L (Jan. 8, 1998).
79. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
80. See id. arts. I–VI.
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humanity was contained in Article VI of the NPT under which
parties agreed to undertake good faith negotiations on effective
measures to halt the arms race and on a future treaty to disarm
completely “under strict and effective international control.”81
Curiously though, the NPT permits any party to exercise their
sovereign right to withdraw from the treaty at any time “if it
decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter
of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its
country.”82
The 1996 International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) Advisory
Opinion on the “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons” confirmed the incoherence and functional
incompetence of international law in this critical area.83 The
opinion was issued at the request of the UN General Assembly
pursuant to Article 96 of the UN Charter and Article 65 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice.84 The General
Assembly asked this question: “Is threat or use of nuclear
weapons in any circumstances permitted under international
law?” Faced with a fundamental existential question the court,
statutorily the most important arbiter of international law
replied incoherently and inconsequently. The Court decidedly
rejected the view of a minority of judges that the threat or use of
nuclear weapons should be unlawful under all circumstances.85
The court could not agree on whether international law as it
existed at the time made the threat or use of nuclear weapons
“lawful or unlawful in the extreme circumstance of self-defence,
in which the very survival of a state would be at stake.”86
However, the court ruled that the “threat or use of force by
81. Id. art. VI.
82. See id. art. X (“Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the
right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the
subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.”).
83. See generally Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 71.
84. See U.N. Charter art. 96, para. 1 (“The General Assembly or the Security
Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on
any legal question.”); Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 65, June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (annexed to U.N. Charter) (authorizing the court
to “give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may
be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such
a request”).
85. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 71.
86. Id. at 263.
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means of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter and that fails to meet all the
requirements of Article 51, is unlawful” and that the “threat or
use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the
requirements of the international law applicable in armed
conflict, particularly those of the principles and rules of
international humanitarian law, as well as with specific
obligations” under agreements dealing with nuclear weapons.87
Essentially the court’s response demonstrated that when it
comes to the threat or use of force, states have considerable
flexibility under international law unless they have first
specifically agreed otherwise. Furthermore, every considered
international law constraint on the use of force was subject to
one or more equally valid principles permitting the use of such
force, especially when it comes to self-preservation of the state.
The prohibition on use of force, for example, is subject to
two critical exceptions: individual or collective self-defense and
UN Security Council authorization. The concept of self-defense
has become increasingly elastic as weaponry and delivery
capabilities have become more threatening. Nuclear weapon
technology, together with ballistic missile and miniaturization
capabilities, has helped to broaden the acceptable range of selfdefense measures that states may pursue. Protection or security
as such comes today not from international law prohibiting the
use of force but from mutual threats or deterrence. Thus, states
are incentivised to fill the regulatory vacuum in international
relations with lethal capabilities. With regard to Security Council
authorization to use force, the practice of the international
community has created a flexible interpretation of what
constitutes legal authorization. This reality also encourages
states not to rely on perceived rules in this area but instead to
build up their own capabilities.

87. See id. at 266; see also INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 4TH EDITION,
supra note 3, at 448. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter obligated UN members to “refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations.“ U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. UN Charter
Article 51 reaffirmed the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.” U.N. Charter art. 51.
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The ICJ opinion acknowledged that, “the Charter neither
expressly prohibits, nor permits, the use of any specific weapon,
including nuclear weapons.”88 Moreover, according to the
Court, while “international customary and treaty law does not
contain any specific prescription authorizing the threat or use of
nuclear weapons or any other weapon in general or in certain
circumstances, in particular those of the exercise of legitimate
self-defense,” there is also no “principle or rule of international
law which would make the legality of the threat or use of nuclear
weapons or of any other weapons dependent on a specific
authorization.”89 All that was left to the Court were insinuations
of legal standards built on the concept of proportionality. This
singularly incoherent concept dissolves into absurdities when
the issue is nuclear weapons and the possibility of nuclear
conflagration.
More than four decades after the NPT entered into force
and nearly seven decades since the earliest efforts to contain the
spread of nuclear weapons, international law, so to speak, has
reached the level of its incompetence when it comes to
preventing nuclear annihilation. Today, international law in this
area has been reduced to rationalizing the right of nations that
currently possess nuclear weapons to wage war against states
without nuclear weapons in the name of preventing those states
from having the same. In other words, if you choose now to have
nuclear weapons, you may be prevented by force supposedly
backed by international law from doing so, even though no
mechanism exists under this interpretation of international law
to make those who already have nuclear weapons give them up.
Meanwhile, the especially odious regime in North Korea
employs its alleged nuclear capabilities to demand international
attention and more tribute, confirming the perspicacity of
countries like India, Pakistan, and Israel that successfully
obtained nuclear weapons in disregard of international
sentiments masquerading as law. International law’s
incoherence and functional incompetence with regard to
avoiding catastrophe stand exposed.

88. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 71, at 244
89. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 71, at 247.
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The reason international law has turned out to be of no
help in restraining nuclear weapons possession and the
inevitable threat of use is buried in its origins and essential
characteristics. International law has developed to legitimate
power among those who already have power. International law
does not discover or confer new powers or rights on those who
merely would like to have it or claim to deserve it.90 This was true
back in its infancy in the period of conquests. It has remained so
despite all the Grotian Moments one could conceive up to now.
Without some radical re-conception of how humans see their
relationships to each other in the world, there is no basis to
imagine a change in the offing.
Previously, many international law scholars and activists
understood this harsh reality of international law and made no
pretense it was otherwise. They limited themselves properly to
restrained but creative appeals to morality and the common
interest of sovereigns and states. Post war liberal
internationalism sought to justify the status quo of the
immediate post war era, and market it exuberantly as
international law, objective, neutral, and beyond politics or
social contestation. Some have chosen not to play along when it
does not suit their interests.
Professor Ved Nanda’s 2009 article on nuclear weapons,
human security, and international law urges a role for
international law “to provide a framework for nuclear
disarmament, a prerequisite for human security.”91 He argues
that, “the end of the Cold War did not remove the threat
nuclear weapons pose to human civilization . . . . Numerous
experts point to a causal relationship between nuclear weapons
and international and national insecurity.”92 The role of

90. See, for example, the film “Unforgiven,” in which the Clint Eastwood
character, William Munny, informs Sheriff Bill, “Deserve’s got nothin to do with it.”
Sherriff Bill’s protest (“I don’t deserve this—to die like this. I was building a house”)
echoes the claims and protests of too many seeking to change the status quo in
international relations through the development and application of international law.
UNFORGIVEN (Warner Bros. 1992); see also Ruth Buchanan & Rebecca Johnson, The
Unforgiven Sources of International Law: Nation-Building, Violence and Gender in the
West(ern), in INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 131 (Doris Buss &
Ambreena Manji eds., 2005).
91. Nanda, supra note 76, at 331.
92. Id.
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international law is to provide a framework for nuclear
disarmament, a prerequisite for human security.93
Nanda’s call echoes Grotius’ appeal to European sovereigns
to embrace rules for building peace and managing destructive
conflicts. Nanda’s work reminds of the horrendous legacy of the
use of nuclear weapons even at its infancy and affirms the
objective reality of the limited utility of nuclear weapons as
instruments of war and domination.94 President Obama has
called for the United States and Russia to agree to a reduction of
each country’s nuclear arsenal to just over 1,000.95 Many
influential parties in both the United States and Russia have
objected to this initiative.96 Both nations are estimated to still
have hundreds of nuclear weapons targeted at each other on
“high alert,” ready to be launched within minutes of a perceived
threat.97 The US Senate has also failed to ratify the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (“CTBT”) signed by
the United States in 1996.98 This treaty is still not in force even
though it has been ratified by 156 countries. Under its terms,
key possessors of nuclear weapons that participated in the
negotiations must first ratify before it can become operative.99
Yet, the problem here is that nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction confer the most extraordinary
93. Id.
94. Id. at 346.
95. See Lawrence M. Krauss, Letting Go of Our Nukes, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/opinion/sunday/letting-go-of-our-nukes.html.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (“CTBT”) opened for
signatures of state parties in 1996. Under the CTBT:
(1) Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test
explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any
such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control; (2) Each
State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or
in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test
explosion or any other nuclear explosion.
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty art I, Sept. 24, 1996, UN Doc
A50/1027 Annex, 35 I.L.M. 1439. See Lawrence Kraus, It’s Time for the U.S. To Finally
Sign the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, SLATE (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/
technology/future_tense/2012/04/comprehensive_
nuclear_test_ban_treaty_the_u_s_should_ratify_it_now_.html; see also Jenifer Mackby,
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, CTR, FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Jan. 23,
2012), http://csis.org/publication/comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-0.
99. See Mackby, supra note 98.
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benefits desired by states since the latter’s fitful emergence in
the mid 1600s: possession of nuclear weapons provides a hedge
against domination by others and non-existence. This is why
regimes in countries as diverse as China, India, Pakistan, and
Israel have obtained them and continued to perfect their
capacities to employ them. Nuclear weapons possession reveals
that the true foundational imperative of a state-based
international system is the existence of the state. Post Second
World War international law offered the bold claim that it could
transform such state interests in a world of extremes into the
interest of humanity as a whole. The stalemate in disarmament
efforts, the embrace of mutual deterrence, and the resort to
threats and violence to prevent other states from joining the
nuclear club show the limits of that claim and affirm the
centrality of national interests, as opposed to the more abstract
notion of the interests of humanity, in our global system.
Meanwhile, “[t]he barrage of threats from North Korea has
sparked talk from within South Korea of the need to develop its
own nuclear weapons. A recent poll shows that two-thirds of
South Korean citizens surveyed support the idea.”100
C. Containing Destructive Conflicts
In new and wild communities where there is violence, an
honest man must protect himself; and until other means of
securing his safety are devised, it is both foolish and wicked
to persuade him to surrender his arms while the men who
are dangerous to the community retain theirs. He should
not renounce the right to protect himself by his own efforts
until the community is so organized that it can effectively
relieve the individual of the duty of putting down violence.
So it is with nations.101

The 2003 Iraq War and the ongoing Syrian civil war are just
two instances in which the post Second World War international
100. K.J. Kwon, Under Threat, South Koreans Mull Nuclear Weapons, CNN (Mar. 18,
2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/18/world/asia/south-korea-nuclear.
101. Theodore Roosevelt, Address Before the Nobel Prize Committee:
International Peace (May 5, 1910), available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_
prizes/peace/laureates/1906/roosevelt-lecture.html.
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legal architecture designed to contain destructive international
and national conflicts has failed. The Iraq War was a classic
international conflict, but the ongoing destruction in Syria,
ostensibly a civil war, represents the more common arena in
which international law’s doctrinal incoherence and functional
incompetence with regard to the containment of destructive
conflicts have been exposed. Today, the cause of peace is
essentially the foundation for interminable conflicts
unrestrained, if they ever were, by borders. The cause of peace is
also the fuel for an escalating and competitive global weapons
trade, whose regulation continues to elude the international
community.102
Containing warfare and promoting peace and security
among sovereign entities are age-old concerns among those who
have promoted the development of international law from the
earliest period.103 Doctrinalists like Vitoria, Ayala, Vazquez, and
Grotius affirmatively argued in the interest of peace for rules
limiting the unbridled right of sovereigns to declare and wage
wars.104 The Twentieth Century saw significant progress that led
to agreements such as the 1907 Hague Convention (No. IV),105
and the 1928 General Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of
War as an Instrument of National Policy.106 But, it took the
Second World War and the ascendance of the United States as
the preeminent world power to bring an energized vision of law,
with all its contradictions, to the forefront of international
102. See The ‘Big Six’ Arms Exporters, AMNESTY INT’L (June 11, 2012),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/big-six-arms-exporters-2012-06-11. The UN General
Assembly adopted the first international agreement regulating the international arms
trade in 2013. The treaty, even when it becomes effective, would not have an
enforcement agency. See Colum Lynch, UN Approves Global Arms Treaty, WASH. POST,
Apr. 2, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-02/world/38208395_1_
legitimate-arms-trade-treaty-humanity-or-war-crimes; Peter Webber, Why the U.S. Isn’t
Signing the U.N.’s Global Arms Treaty, WEEK (June 3, 2013), http://theweek.com/article/
index/245023/why-the-us-isnt-signing-the-uns-global-arms-treaty.
103. See, e.g., HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (A.C. Campbell,
A.M. trans., Batoche Books 2001) (1625) (translated from the original De Jure Belli ac
Pacis).
104. See id.; see also Anghie, Colonial Origins, supra note 15; Villa, supra note 32.
105. See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, U.S.T.S. 539.
106. See General Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument
of National Policy, Aug. 27 1928, 46 Stat. 234, U.S.T.S. 796 [hereinafter Kellogg–Briand
Pact].
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relations. The United States created the foundation for this
revived vision when it insisted that vanquished leaders in Europe
and Asia be tried for crimes under international law, including
waging aggressive war, crimes against humanity, and other
crimes in their conduct of the war. This novel approach to
ending international war raised hopes and deepened faith
among those who envisioned international law as an unbiased
regulator of the right of states to wage war, jus ad bellum,107 their
conduct during war, jus in bello,108 and their relationship with
each other during times of peace. The United States also
promoted the establishment of international institutions like the
United Nations to support the international commitment to
build a regime of peace dictated by law.109 The Preamble of the
United Nations Charter expressed the determination of “WE THE
PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS . . . to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war.”110 The Charter executed
this determination by making international peace a prime
obligation of the institution and its members.111 The Charter
specifically required nations to “settle their international
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.”112
Members were also required to “refrain in their international
relations from threat or use of force against the territorial

107. Earlier efforts to achieve legally binding limitations on the rights of nations
to wage wars can be tracked back to at least Grotius’ De Jure Belli ac Pacis, supra note 103,
and includes the 1928 Pact of Paris (The Kellogg-Briand Pact), supra note 106.
108. At the forefront of efforts to regulate conduct during warfare, the
foundation of humanitarian law, were the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, supra note 105, and the Geneva Conventions,
Convention for the Protection of War Victims Concerning Amelioration of the
Conditions of Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the Protection of War Victims Concerning
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention for the
Protection of War Victims Concerning Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention for the Protection of War Victims
Concerning Protection of Civilians in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287. The Nuremberg Principles and judgment enriched this area of
international law.
109. See U.N. Charter pmbl.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., U.N. Charter pmbl., arts. 1, 2, 4–6, 11, 12.
112. Id. art. 2, para. 3.
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integrity or political independence of any state.”113 In addition,
the UN Security Council was created as a principal organ of the
UN and granted broad powers to supervise this renewed
international commitment to contain destructive international
conflicts and limit the right of states to use force in international
affairs.114 It is instructive that the real power to enforce peace
was thus entrusted to the Security Council, an overtly political
organ as opposed to the ICJ. A strong and expanding secretariat
headed by the UN Secretary-General was also developed to
implement these aims. Other global institutions and
prescriptions in the areas of human rights and economic
development were developed to support this architecture of
peace and conflict regulation. Furthermore, regional
institutions and prescriptions were fostered to complement and
supplement their global counterparts.
However, the post war initiatives to deepen the role of law
in international peace and security have not produced
impressive results. About 250 major wars have taken place since
1945, with over 50 million people killed as a result, and millions
more otherwise affected.115 Arguably, it could have been much
worse. For a relatively brief period of time, the Cold War actually
constrained the nature and scope of destructive conflicts as it
focused our passion on the possibilities of global conflagration.
The overwhelming potential of each camp to destroy humanity
provided an effective even if temporary disciplining mechanism
for violent international conflicts. Fear of nuclear annihilation
became the guardian of an ephemeral and morally ambiguous
peace.
The end of the Cold War did not yield a peace dividend or
a structurally different approach to international security.
Instead, it unleashed broader and more complicated destructive
forces across a wide swath of the earth, sparing no continent or
region. The international peace regime centered at the United

113. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
114. See id. art. 24 (“In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United
Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree in carrying out its duties
under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.”).
115. See War and Peace, PEACE PLEDGE UNION, http://www.ppu.org.uk/learn/
infodocs/st_war_peace.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
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Nations, with its exaggerated focus on legal rules, has not been
able to respond in any creditable manner. One could search in
vain for either coherence or competence in its responses. The
Rwandan genocide, the crimes against humanity that marked
the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, and the protracted
destruction of Somali civil society and governmental authority,
were only some of the earliest tests that the system failed. Some
of the wars like those in Sudan or the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (“DRC”) have gone on for so long, they have become
effectively normalized aspects of our global system.116 Millions
have died even as the international bureaucracy and its rhetoric
of peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace building, humanitarian
intervention, responsibility to protect, and such, have grown in
size, volume, and self-importance. In order to accept
international law’s relevance to diverse decisions, desires and
impulses that result in humanity’s unyielding cavalcade of
savagery, one has to reject the history and pattern of violence,
suspend our capacity for reason or emotion, and treat each
episode of contemporary transnational mass murder brought
persistently to our consciousness everyday by modern
technology, as if a flaw.
1. Containing War Among Nations: the 2003 Invasion of Iraq
Not perhaps that primitive men were more faithless than
their descendants of today, but that they went straighter to
their aim, and were more artless in their recognition of
success as the only standard of morality.117
Our nation enters this conflict reluctantly, yet our purpose
is sure. The people of the United States and our friends and
allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that

116. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Africa’s Dirty Wars, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 8, 2012, at
33 (reviewing WILLIAM RENO, WARFARE IN INDEPENDENT AFRICA (2011)); Alex de Waal,
The Wars of Sudan, NATION, Mar. 1, 2007, http://www.thenation.com/article/warssudan#; Randolph Martin, Sudan’s Perfect War, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2002,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/57818/randolph-martin/sudans-perfect-war;
Simon Robinson & Vivienne Walt, The Deadliest War in the World, TIME, May 28, 2006,
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1198921,00.html.
117. JOSEPH CONRAD, NOSTROMO 234 (Dover 2002).

2013]

INCOHERENCE AND INCOMPETENCE

91

threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder . . . .
Now that conflict has come, the only way to limit its
duration is to apply decisive force and I assure you this will
not be a campaign of half measures and we will accept no
outcome but victory. My fellow citizens, the dangers to our
country and the world will be overcome . . . .118

The 2003 Iraq War stands as the most striking
demonstration of the incoherence and functional incompetence
of the international law peace enforcement regime. Most
observers today agree that the US-led invasion of Iraq was a gross
violation of the international prohibition against using war to
resolve international disputes absent lawful self-defense
justification or approval of the UN Security Council. Kofi
Annan, the UN Secretary-General at the time of the invasion,
has admitted that the 2003 invasion of Iraq was illegal under
international law.119 Yet, the position of officials of the invading
countries remains steadfastly that the invasion was legal. Former
Secretary of State Colin Powell insisted that the invasion “was
totally consistent with international law.”120 And it is difficult to
disagree with Secretary Powell. International law in general
embraces this sort of self-validation of right and wrong through
the successful exercise of power. The post Second World War
peace regime of international law did not change this reality. It
is an inescapable fact, even if banal, that subsequent
international criminal law was built upon the prosecution of the
vanquished of that conflict. As US Chief Justice Stone observed
then, “[s]o far as the Nuremberg trial is an attempt to justify the
application of the power of the victor to the vanquished because
the vanquished made aggressive war, . . . I dislike extremely to
see it dressed up with the false facade of legality. The best that
can be said for it is that it is a political act of the victorious States
118. President Bush, Address on the Start of the War in Iraq, supra note 72.
119. Tammy Kupperman, Powell Says U.S.-Led War on Iraq ‘Consistent with
International Law’, NBC NEWS (Sept. 17, 2004, 11:34 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/
id/6016893/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/powell-says-us-led-war-iraq-consistentinternational-law/#.UltNo2R4ZDE (“Asked whether the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq broke
international law, Annan said, ‘yes, if you wish. I have indicated it was not in conformity
with the UN Charter from our point of view, and from the charter point of view it was
illegal.’”).
120. Id.
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which may be morally right.”121 Who prosecutes the victors? Or,
as another observer puts it, “for the Nuremberg and Tokyo
courts, it mattered little to the validity of criminal proceedings
against Axis leadership that Allied victors had committed vast
war crimes of their own.”122
The peace regime of the UN Charter is fully flexible in its
interpretive possibilities and quite capable of these sorts of
manipulation by the victors. The peace and security
maintenance provisions of the UN Charter cannot claim
coherence or determinacy. They are always contested and
especially subject to the capacity of the powerful. Indeed, that is
why five of the most powerful members of the United Nations
insisted and were granted veto powers over substantive decisions
of the UN Security Council.123 It is unsurprising that these
members also possess the largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons.
Faith in international law holds only so much promise even for
the most powerful.
Reflecting on the ten-year anniversary of the Iraq War,
Hans Blix, former head of UN weapons inspection in Iraq,
called the war “a terrible mistake and violation of UN
Charter.”124 Surveys also show that a majority of the American
people share that view.125 However, the Iraq war was more than a
tragic mistake, made by a small group of misguided national
leaders. It marked an enormous rejection of one of the core
claims of modern international law as the foundation of world
peace and highlighted the inherent incoherence of
international law pertaining to the use of force. The disciplining
of sovereign right to declare war, jus ad bellum, was supposed to
be one of the prime accomplishments of the regime constructed
121. See HENRY STEINER ET AL., supra note 5, at 127 (quoting A LPHEUS
T HOMAS MASON, HARLAN F ISKE STONE : PILLAR OF THE LAW (1956)).
122. See MARK OSIEL, MASS A TROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW
122 (1997).
123. U.N. Charter art. 27 (requiring the concurring votes of the permanent
members on non-procedural matters); Id. art. 23 (giving permanent membership to
five nations: Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States).
124. See Hans Blix, Hans Blix: Iraq War Was a Terrible Mistake and Violation of U.N.
Charter, CNN (Mar. 19, 2013, 4:36 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/18/opinion/
iraq-war-hans-blix/index.html?iref=allsearch.
125. See Andrew Dugan, On 10th Anniversary, 53% in U.S. See Iraq War as Mistake,
GALLUP POLITICS (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/161399/10thanniversary-iraq-war-mistake.aspx.
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after the Second World War. The discipline clearly failed in the
case of Iraq as it has in other conflicts because it was built on a
flimsy foundation composed of conflicting interests and hopes.
The rhetoric of thinly disguised Pax Americana contained in the
UN Charter prescriptions on the use of force suggested faith
that the world at that time had experienced a sort of end of
history moment. Once it became apparent as more dominated
peoples became free and began to define their interests and that
many others preferred change to stability, the promises of peace
built on law became subordinate to very narrow appreciation of
national interest. As it turned out, there were enough gaps in
the plain statement of the form and substance of the
international law of peace to allow for the illusion of
compliance. As one group of defenders of the invasion argued,
“[i]n the end, each use of force must find legitimacy in the facts
and circumstances that the state believes have made it
necessary.”126 Well put. The international law of peace, the
prohibition against waging aggressive war, and the requirement
of self-defense or authorization of the UN Security Council, are
reduced to the belief of the aggressor state under the
circumstances. Needless to say, not every state would have the
capacity to act on their belief or deal with the consequences of
such action. Thus, even though it could not get support from
the Security Council to invade Iraq and faced widespread
opposition around the world, the United States and a few allies
proceeded employing a variety of dubious law-sounding
rationales to justify its actions and maintain legal fiction.
Thomas Franck, writing shortly after the invasion,
bemoaned the death of UN Charter restraints on the use of
force.127 He lamented:
[W]hile a few government lawyers still go through the
motions of asserting that the invasion of Iraq was justified by
126. William H. Taft & Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and International Law,
97 AM. J. INT’L. L. 557, 557 (2003). Mr. Taft was the legal adviser to the U.S. State
Department at the time of the invasion.
127. See Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 97
AM. J. INT’L. L. 607 (2003) [hereinafter Franck, What Happens Now?] (raising similar
questions about the efficacy of the UN Charter use of force regime as in another article
written decades earlier); see Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing
Norms Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT’L. L. 809 (1970) [hereinafter
Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?].
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our inherent right of self-defense, or represented a
collective measure authorized by the Security Council under
Chapter VII of the Charter, the leaders of America no
longer bother with such legal niceties. Instead, they boldly
proclaim a new policy that openly repudiates the obligation.
Article 2(4). What is remarkable, this time around, is that
once obligatory efforts by the aggressor to make a serious
effort to stretch the law to legitimate state action have given
way to a drive to repeal the law altogether, replacing it with
a principle derived from the Athenians at Melos: “the strong
do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”128

The Bush administration’s successful bulldozing of
international laws’ constraints on international war making
confirmed the hollowness and transient nature of these
commitments. It is simply not credible to believe that there is
much more to these pledges of peaceful behavior than a
nation’s assessment of its might or likelihood of success in
decisions to wage war. We also see such calculations in play as
nations join the feast of murder and mayhem in Syria, and as
they march toward violent confrontation over Iran’s nuclear
ambitions. The triumph of this vision of international law was
captured in a recent New York Times headline for an opinion
piece dealing with the Syrian civil war: “Bomb Syria, Even if It Is
Illegal.”129
As for Iraq, the rest of the international community quickly
confirmed the incoherence and functional incompetence of the
international legal regime with regard to the invasion of Iraq.
Barely six weeks after the UN Security Council had refused to
endorse the invasion that many including the UN SecretaryGeneral had called illegal, the Security Council voted without
opposition to endorse the occupation and administration of
Iraq by the victorious invaders.130 The vote was justified as
“simply a recognition of the facts on the ground.”131 Those
nations who could, moved on to protecting as much of their
national commercial interests in Iraq as they could in light of
128. Franck, What Happens Now?, supra note 127, at 608.
129. Ian Hurd, Bomb Syria, Even If It Is Illegal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2013, http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/08/28/opinion/bomb-syria-even-if-it-is-illegal.html?_ r=0.
130. See Tony Karon, Behind The UN Vote on Iraq, TIME, May 22, 2003,
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,454203,00.html.
131. Id.
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the new realities created by victory, even if temporary and
ultimately illusory. The result confirmed up to a point an earlier
conclusion by Professor Franck that “[n]ational self-interest,
particularly the national self-interest of the super-Powers, has
usually won out over treaty obligations . . . It is as if
international law, always something of a cultural myth, has been
demythologized.”132 This conclusion must now incorporate the
fact the United States is now the sole surviving super-power and,
at least in the case of Iraq, acted as if that is the way it will always
be.
The incoherence and functional incompetence of the
international peace regime were further illustrated just a few
years later. Many of those countries that were outraged at the
Bush administration’s almost singular determination of what
constitutes authorization under international law to go to war in
Iraq, eagerly sought the war-making capacities of the United
States in new conflicts against other “rogues” in the Middle East:
First, it was to liberate Libyans from Muammar Gaddafi.133 Then,
it was Syrians from Bashar al-Assad.134 Some neo-conservatives in
the United States had once ridiculed the United Nations as “the
tooth fairy of American politics: Few adults believe in it, but it’s
generally regarded as a harmless story to amuse the children.
Since 9/11, however, the UN has ceased to be harmless . . .
The United Nations has emerged at best as irrelevant to the
terrorist threat that concerns us, and at worst as an obstacle to
our winning the war on terrorism.”135 The ease with which the
132. Franck, Who Killed Article 2 (4)?, supra note 127, at, 836.
133. See Ross Douthat, Libya’s Unintended Consequences, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/08/opinion/sunday/libyas-unintendedconsequences.html?_r=0.; Seumas Milne, If the Libyan War Was About Saving Lives, It Was
a Catastrophic Failure, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 26, 2011, http://
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/oct/26/libya-war-saving-lives-catastrophicfailure; James Risen et al., Militant Forces Got Arms Meant for Libya Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
6, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/06/world/africa/weapons-sent-to-libyanrebels-with-us-approval-fell-into-islamist-hands.html?pagewanted=all.
134. See Mark Mazzetti et al., No Quick Impact in U.S. Arms Plan for Syria Rebels, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/15/world/middleeast/noquick-impact-in-us-arms-plan-for-syria-rebels.html?pagewanted=all; Syrian Rebel Fighters’
Civil War Within a Civil War, BBC NEWS (July 12, 2013, 9:34 AM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23285869.
135. See David Frum & Richard Perle, UN Should Change—Or U.S. Should Quit,,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2004, http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jan/23/opinion/oefrum23.
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United States was able to remove international legal obstacles to
its unilateral decision to employ force in Iraq should encourage
a more benign evaluation from these fervent advocates of
unipolarism.136
2. Containing Civil Wars: Syria
But make no mistake: President Obama believes there must
be accountability for those who would use the world’s most
heinous weapons against the world’s most vulnerable
people. Nothing today is more serious, and nothing is
receiving more serious scrutiny.137

With regard to Syria where an apparently authentic civil war
has now attracted a diverse group of international backers, there
is little pretense that The UN Charter-based post Second World
War regime of peace and security is operational.138 With a
conservative estimate of over 100,000 people dead,139 at this
point, a revolt against a dictatorship has morphed into a
136. See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, FOREIGN AFF. (AM. &
WORLD), 1990–1991, at 23. Unipolarists, like Krauthammer, argued at the time that
“the gap in power between the leading nation (the United States) and all the others
was so unprecedented as to yield an international structure unique to modern history:
unipolarity.” Id. They pressed for the United States to take advantage of its singular
posture in international affairs. See id.; see also Statement of Principles, PROJECT FOR NEW
A M.
CENTURY
(June
3,
1997),
http://www.newamericancentury.org/
statementofprinciples.htm.
137. John Kerry, U.S. Secretary of State, Statement on Chemical Weapons in
Syria (Aug. 26, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/27/world/
middleeast/text-of-kerrys-statement-on-chemical-weapons-in-syria.html?_r=0).
138. See Steven A. Cook, After the Arab Spring, ATLANTIC, Mar. 28, 2011,
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/03/after-the-arab-spring/
73086; Steve Coll, The Syrian Problem, NEW YORKER, May 30, 2011,
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2011/05/30/110530taco_talk_coll; Nada
Bakri, “United Nations Says Unrest In Syria Amounts To Civil War,” N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1,
2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/02/world/middleeast/united-nations-sayssyrian-unrest-amounts-to-civil-war.html; Anne Barnard, Missteps by Rebels Erode their
Support Among Syrians, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/
09/world/middleeast/in-syria-missteps-by-rebels-erode-their-support.html?
pagewanted=all.
139. Estimate is as of late July 2013. See Albert Aji & Edith M. Lederer, U.N.: More
than 100,000 Now Dead in Syria’s Civil War, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 25, 2013,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/07/25/100000-dead-in-syrias-civilwar/2587521/.
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sectarian conflict with diverse international sponsors. It is
difficult to see that the conflict will dissipate when the current
regime is ousted.140 After years of partisan involvement, the
international community’s best ideas now revolve around
arming one side or the other or coming up with a legal pretext
to intervene directly.141 At the 2012 UN summit, UN SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki Moon called the Syrian civil war a “serious and
growing threat to international peace and security” and urged a
stop to “the violence and flows of arms to both sides.”142 At the
same gathering, President Obama expressed a different
conclusion. He pledged support for the Syrians trying to oust
Assad even as Russia, China, and others remained firmly in
Assad’s camp.143
Today, the United States and other western countries have
considerable support, even in the Arab world, to arm the Syrian
rebels with deadly weapons or to take additional actions against
the Assad regime.144 Evidence that the Syrian government forces
have employed chemical weapons has provided additional
reasons for international opponents of the regime to express
outrage and press for military intervention.145 The Syrian

140. Id.
141. See Arab League Draft Resolution Declares ‘Right’ to Arm Syrian Rebels, RADIO
FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY (Mar. 26, 2013, 8:29 PM), http://www.rferl.org/content/
syria-arab-league-seat/24939212.html; see also Yara Bayoumy & Amena Bakr, Western,
Arab States to Step up Syrian Rebel Support, REUTERS (June 22, 2013, 10:48 PM),
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/06/22/uk-syria-crisis-idUKBRE95K17720130622.
142. See U.N. Chief Demands Global Action to End War in Syria, USA TODAY (Sept.
26, 2012, 12:33 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012/
09/26/un-chief-demands-global-action-to-end-war-in-syria/57839628/1.
143. Id.; see also Tabassum Zakaria & Susan Cornwell, Exclusive: U.S. Congressional
Hurdles Lifted on Arming Syrian Rebels, REUTERS (July 23, 2013, 6:45 PM), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/22/us-usa-syria-arms-idUSBRE96L0W520130722.
144. See Arab League Draft Resolution Declares ‘Right’ to Arm Syrian Rebels, supra note
141.
145. Rick Gladstone et al., UK to Bring Resolution to Security Council, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 29, 2013, http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2013/08/29/syriaasserts-claim-new-strikes-impasse-looms/pZicPVjG6hm3D8mfJzuNBM/story.html. The
Syrian government has apparently caved in to the threat of force by the United States
by agreeing to join the Chemical Weapons Convention and to allow internationally
supervised destruction of it chemical weapons. See Patrick J. McDonell, Syria Meets
Chemical Weapons Deadline, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2013, www.latimes.com/world/la-fgsyria-chemical-deadline-20131028,0,7141214.story
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government has its own group of similarly committed backers.146
Few objective observers can discern the virtues of one side over
the other when it comes to justifying the deployment of
additional deadly weapons in an already horrifying
environment.
It is a testament to modern international law’s incoherence
that all sides could easily claim to be on the side of peace while
killing each other with such alacrity. The UN Charter curiously
did not explicitly extend its use of force restraints, flawed as they
have been in practice, to internal or domestic conflicts. This is
surprising because one of the prime lessons derived from the
Second World War was that how a nation treats its citizens could
have important consequences for the rest of the world.147 This
recognition is behind the Charter’s linking of human rights
promotion to international peace and security. Article 24
“confer[s] on the Security Council primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security.”148 Yet, the
Charter’s peace regime, including Security Council authority to
maintain international peace and security, focused on reducing
conflicts among nations ignoring the empirical facts that huge
numbers of people perish or suffer in internal conflicts and that
such conflicts rarely fail to attract outside intervention or
develop external consequences.149 The formal powers and
procedures available to the Security Council to promote
peaceful settlement of disputes,150 and to deal with threats to
peace,151 are built upon this nexus of interstate conflicts.
Moreover, Article 2 (4) prohibited “the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state.”152 While UN practice has evolved over time to stretch
understanding of what constitutes threats to international peace
146. See Karen De Young & Joby Warrick, Russia Sends Arms to Syria As It Tries to
POST,
May
29,
2013,
Reassert
Its
Role
in
Region,
WASH.
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-05-29/world/39597670_1_tartus-foreignminister-sergei-lavrov-supplying-syria.
147. See President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress (Jan. 6,
1941); U.N. Charter, pmbl., art. 1.
148. U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1.
149. Id. art. 1, para. 1 (stating that one of the purposes of the United Nations is
“to maintain international peace and security”).
150. See id. ch. VI.
151. See id. ch. VII.
152. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
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and security, the legal regime fosters incoherence and
incompetence. In practice, there are no discernible standards
for UN involvement except the level of atrocity. Disputes and
travesties are allowed to foster within countries for too long as
the world waits, in effect, to see if the state can crush challenges
to its power monopoly. The vacuum has encouraged a sort of
free-for-all as other states get to determine, based on their own
interests, whether and when a particular violent conflict in
another state should be understood in international terms.153
Thus, we find in Syria, that a popular revolt is fostered
supposedly in the name of freedom and democracy against a
dictatorship by other repressive regimes like Saudi Arabia,
Jordan, and Qatar. The latter states then get support from
Western nations in the name of freedom and democracy.
Meanwhile, at the United Nations, there is no consensus,
agreement or decision, so coalitions of the willing form to act as
they see their interests.154 It would thus be a tragic error to see
what has developed in Syria as a successful deployment of
international law. That Syria has agreed to respect the Chemical
Weapons Convention and to give up its chemical weapons
stockpile under the threat of force by a bigger power merely
reaffirms the triumph of force over law and the resilience of the
status quo. The Assad regime remains in place. The violence
continues.155 It is the same old miserable world.

153. For instance, even though the United States had already called for the
removal of the Assad regime in Syria and was facilitating the delivery of weapons and
other supplies to the regime’s opponents, the charge that the Syrian regime had used
chemicals weapons appeared to have provided the Obama administration with more
reasons for expressing outrage and employing military force. US Secretary of State
John Kerry harshly condemned the use of chemical weapons:
What we saw in Syria last week should shock the conscience of the world. It
defies any code of morality. Let me be clear: The indiscriminate slaughter of
civilians, the killing of women and children and innocent bystanders, by
chemical weapons is a moral obscenity. By any standard it is inexcusable . . . .
Kerry, Remarks on Syria, supra note 137; see also, Connor Friedersdorf, The
Washington Post’s Frivolous Call for War in Syria, ATLANTIC, Aug. 22, 2013,
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/08/the-em-washington-posts-emfrivolous-call-for-war/278939.
154. See Hurd, supra note 129; see also Gladstone et al., supra note 145.
155. See Ezra Klein, Why Do We Even Care About Syria’s Chemical Weapons?,
Bloomberg (Sept. 4, 2013, 4:13 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-04/whydo-we-even-care-about-syria-s-chemical-weapons-.html.
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However, the global arms trade will not suffer.156 It has the
international law of peace and human rights on its side. Post
Second World War international law has not found a formula
for maintaining international peace and security despite its
pretentions. Its doctrines lack coherence and its institutions are
bereft of competence.
D. Promoting Decency: Ameliorating Misery and Structured Poverty
International law, which has excelled in the punctilious
insistence on the respect owed by one sovereign State to
another, henceforth acknowledges the sovereignty of man.
For fundamental human rights are rights superior to the law
of the sovereign state.157

This section examines the relationship between the
ascendance of human rights discourse and activism on the one
hand, and global misery and structured poverty on the other, to
support these criticisms. Until recently, various sources placed
the number of people who are poor at about forty-seven percent
of the world’s population, with roughly half of that number
classified as abjectly poor.158 The World Bank and the United

156. See Bruce Kennedy, U.S. Set to Lose Top-Gun Status in Global Arms Trade, MSNMoney (Jun 26, 2013, 11:30 AM), http://money.msn.com/now/us-set-to-lose-top-gunstatus-in-global-arms-trade. According to a recent report:
International weapons sales have proved to be a thriving global business in
economically tough times. According to the Congressional Research Service
(CRS), such sales reached an impressive $85 billion in 2011, nearly double
the figure for 2010. This surge in military spending reflected efforts by major
Middle Eastern powers to bolster their armories with modern jets, tanks, and
missiles—a process constantly encouraged by the leading arms manufacturing
countries (especially the US and Russia) as it helps keep domestic production
lines humming.
Michael Klare, The Booming Global Arms Trade Is Creating a New Cold War, MOTHER
JONES (May 30, 2013, 2:28 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/
global-arms-trade-new-cold-war.
157. See H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 61 (1950).
158. See Poverty Overview, WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/0,,contentMDK:20040961~menuPK:
435040~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:430367~isCURL:Y,00.html (last visited
Oct. 14, 2013); see generally Human Development Reports: 1990–2011, HUM. DEV. RS,
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2013); WORLD BANK, WORLD
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Nations Development Program (“UNDP”) have long employed
a formula that characterized poverty as subsistence on less than
US$2.00 (sometimes US$2.50 is used) a day.159 Those living on
less than one dollar (or US$1.25) are considered abjectly or
extremely poor.160 The Word Bank recently calculated that there
are about 1.22 billion people in the world living below the
extreme poverty line even after, it claims, hundreds of millions
have been lifted off the extreme poverty roll in the last three
decades.161 Another 2.4 billion people are still considered to be
just poor, calculated to be living on less than US$2.00 a day.162
According to the UNDP, “the proportion of people living on
less than $1.25 a day fell from 47 per cent in 1990 to 24 per cent
in 2008—a reduction from over 2 billion to less than 1.4
billion.”163 However, the percentage of poor in South Asia and
Africa still averages about seventy percent of the populations.164
Those who are extremely poor constitute on the average about
thirty-one percent of the population in South Asia and nearly
fifty percent in Sub-Saharan Africa.165
The single most important factor in the privileged position
of international law after the Second World War has been the
explicit assertion that the discipline offered the optimal path
toward achieving both international peace and security, and
individual freedom and security. US President Franklin D.
Roosevelt had opened the way in his famous “Four Freedoms”
address in January 1941.166 Roosevelt’s justifications for
American involvement in the war on the side of Great Britain
extended his domestic social justice vision to a world in

DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010: DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE 392 (2010), available
at http://wdronline.worldbank.org//worldbank/bookpdfdownload/33.
159. See, e.g., Poverty Overview, supra note 158.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See UNITED NATIONS, THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT 2012,
at 4 (2012) available at http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/MDG%20
Report%202012.pdf.
164. See Poverty, WORLD BANK, data.worldbank.org/topic/poverty (last visited
Sept. 17 2013).
165. Id.
166. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, President, Annual Message (Four Freedoms) to
Congress (Jan. 6, 1941), available at http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=
true&doc=70&page=transcript).
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turmoil.167 He offered ordinary people a reason the fight and die
beyond the traditional national or imperial imperatives.168
Post war international efforts to codify this successful
mobilization strategy began with the UN Charter.169 People no
longer have to fight just for abstract ideas of statehood or
national identity; they now have a personal stake in the fight.
The Four Freedoms—freedom of speech, freedom of worship,
freedom from want, and freedom from fear—now became part
of the structure and purpose of a new international order.170
The UN Charter extended this stake to all humanity when it tied
the reaffirmation of “faith in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of
men and women and of nations large and small,” to the
commitment “to save succeeding generations from the scourge
of war.”171 Furthermore, the UN Charter highlighted the
promotion of human rights as a key purpose of the renewed
international scheme.172 The UDHR173 and the Twin
Covenants174, elaborating an assortment of rights ranging from
civil and political, to economic, social, and cultural, added to
what has become today an impressively comprehensive, almost
hegemonic scheme of rights identification, definition, and
implementation.175 Despite early efforts to privilege one category
167. Id. at 8 (“We look forward to a world founded upon four essential human
freedoms. The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world.
The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way— everywhere in
the world. The third is freedom from want . . . everywhere in the world. The fourth is
freedom from fear . . . anywhere in the world.”).
168. See generally id.
169. See U.N. Charter art. 1.
170. See id.
171. See id. pmbl.
172. See id. art. 1, para. 3.
173. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(“UDHR”), together with the twin covenants—the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the International Covenant on Economic Social and
Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)—are considered the International Bill of Rights.
174. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 14668,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec 16, 1966); see International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, G.A. Res 14531, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (Dec. 16, 1966).
175. See Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, What are Human Rights?,
HUM.
RIGHTS,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHuman
U.N.
Rights.aspx (last visited Sept. 17, 2013) (“Universal human rights are often expressed
and guaranteed by law, in the forms of treaties, customary international law, general
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of rights over others, the human rights community insists that
rights as such are indivisible, equal, and interdependent.176 Yet
economic and social rights in discourse and practice have
struggled to obtain the degree of respect and fulfillment
accorded to civil and political rights.
Critical analyses of rights discourse and activism have
highlighted the same types of deficiencies raised about the
broader field of international law. Charges of doctrinal
incoherence and functional incompetence are amply supported
by examples within all categories of the human rights corpus.177
However, while the deficiencies of international law might
appear more dramatic when issues of annihilation or wars are
discussed, they are just as critical when structured poverty and
endemic misery are considered.
1. Misery, Law, and the Millennium Development Goals
Developing countries are on track to meet, ahead of time,
the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goal to
reduce by half the world’s extreme poverty rate by 2015.
Over the past few decades, hundreds of millions of people
have benefited from a greater access to education and
better-paying jobs – two of the most important tickets to a
better life. Yet, nearly 1.3 billion people remain below the
extreme poverty line with an income of US $1.25 or less a
day. Another 2.6 billion live on less than US $2 a day,
another common measurement of deep deprivation.178

principles and other sources of international law. International human rights law lays
down obligations of Governments to act in certain ways or to refrain from certain acts,
in order to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms of
individuals or groups.”).
176. See id. As the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights puts
it: “Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, whatever our nationality,
place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, or any
other status. We are all equally entitled to our human rights without discrimination.
These rights are all interrelated, interdependent and indivisible.” Id.
177. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 18; Hillary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin,
The Gender of Jus Cogens, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 63 (1993); Makau Mutua, The Ideology of
Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 589 (1996).
178. United Nations Millennium Campaign, FACEBOOK (Feb. 8 2013, 6:29 AM)
https://www.facebook.com/mcampaign/posts/602694636423410.
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The world is replete with misery made an acceptable part of
the human experience despite routine pronouncements, plans,
conferences, agendas, agreements and assorted schemes to
combat it. Most today would not argue that for a large number
of human beings, survival is an everyday imperative in their
short time on this earth. The most crass among us might argue
that things are much better today than in the past. And global
efforts today often revolve around how clear the path to
reducing global misery would be if we could only do this small
thing, adopt this plan, or impose this tax, or plan for another
grand initiative sprinkled liberally with the language of law.
When it comes to ameliorating misery on a global scale,
international law and systems have supported two basic
approaches: charity, and commerce. The former approach is
riddled with the corruption, paternalism, and infantilism
generated by bilateral aid agreements, security assistance, and
international non-governmental organizational intervention.
Adherents of the latter approach have perfected international
law, international institutions, and legal process as instruments
to maintain inherited advantages and global inequality. For
example, the WTO presides over a global trade hegemony that
ignores billions of dollars in subsidies developed nations provide
to their domestic agricultural industries in violation of
international trade law and to the severe detriment of the
capacities of many of the least developed countries to export
their produce.179 Meanwhile, the World Bank and the IMF insist
on standards of economic conduct by developing nations that
are not generally applied against more developed nations.180

179. According to the World Bank:
Agriculture is often the economic driving force in developing countries.
WTO statistics show that agriculture accounts for over one-third of export
earnings for almost 50 developing countries, and for about 40 of them this
sector accounts for over half of export earnings. However, significant
agricultural subsidies provided by OECD country governments to their
farmers compromises the ability of developing country farmers to participate
in global agricultural trade reducing their income and profit streams and
their ability to escape poverty.
Agricultural Trade, WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/O6R2M27TN0.
180. See generally JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
(2002).

2013]

INCOHERENCE AND INCOMPETENCE

105

After decades of fighting over national and international
legal obligations to help the world’s poorest escape poverty and
to assist the less developed states improve their lot, discourses on
the right to development have been replaced by faith in the
market.181 International law has conceded its inconsequence. In
September 2000, world leaders gathered in New York to
announce, with great press coverage, the latest international
agenda to fight misery and other indicia of structured poverty in
the world—The MDGs.182 The official story was that leaders of
189 countries came together and promised to “free people from
extreme poverty and multiple deprivations.”183 The promise was
structured in the form of eight non-binding Millennium goals to
be achieved by 2015. Goal One, the commitment to halve the
proportion of the world’s poorest by 2015 has received the most
attention.184 World leaders and international bureaucrats insist
that there is definite connection between the MDGs and human
rights, and there are of course rear guard action being waged by
die-hard international law activists and scholars to make the
same point.185 Yet, the adoption of the MDGs represented the
exhaustion of the movement to give the global struggle against
misery and structured poverty an international legal foundation.
Neo-liberalism won at least with respect to those states that
cannot fight back with other resources. The right to
development movement was crushed long ago and proponents
181. See, e.g., Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/28, U.N.
Doc. A/41/28 (1986); see also Bedjaoui, supra note 16, at 178–83; Mohammed Bedjaoui,
The Right to Development, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 1177
(Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991); U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working
Group on the Right to Development on its Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/47
(2007).
182. See United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc
A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000). The Millennium Development Goals were: (1) Eradicate
extreme poverty and hunger; (2) Achieve universal primary education; (3) Promote
gender equality and empower women; (4) Reduce child mortality; (5) Improve
maternal health; (6) Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; (7) Ensure
environmental sustainability; and (8) Develop a global partnership for development.
See The Millennium Development Goals: Eight Goals for 2015, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME,
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview/ (last visited Oct. 14,
2013).
183. The Millennium Development Goals, supra note 182.
184. Id.
185. See Human Rights Are the Basis for Achieving the MDGs, U.N. HUM. RTS.,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/MDG/Pages/FoundationforEngagement.aspx (last
visited Oct. 14, 2013).
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of economic and social rights have been well confined to
academia and assorted bands of non-governmental
organizations.186 The earnest but often insufficiently critical
study in Western legal academies, of limited judicial opinions
such as Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corp.,187 Soobramoney v
Minister of Health (Kwa-Zulu Natal),188 and Government of South
Africa v. Grootboom,189 from Third World legal outposts, sustains
hope that is the one true thing international law retains today.190
The turn to MDGs replaced whatever that was left of the
international commitment to human rights in the social and
economic sphere with deeply political methods and goals,
disentangled from any notion of obligation on the part of the
privileged toward those for whom an escape to mere poverty
would be a substantial advance. The MDG’s gratuitous promises
were a raw demonstration of how little the more developed
countries were willing to concede in the global struggle for
economic and social benefits.
The most recent UNDP report, which touts the “Rise of the
South,” captured the reality that international law has been
abandoned or at least diminished in the struggle against global
misery.191 According to the report, there has been a “profound
shift in global dynamics driven by the fast-rising new powers of

186. Though the UN declaration did mention the commitment “to making the
right to development a reality for everyone and to freeing the entire human race from
want.” United Nations Millennium Declaration, supra noted 182.
187. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp., (1985) 2 Supp. S.C.R. 51, A.I.R. 1986
S.C. 180 (India).
188. Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) (S.
Afr.).
189. Gov’t of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC)
(S. Afr.).
190. These cases are sometimes held up as evidence of the progressive
realization of social rights through litigation and legal decisions in countries like India
and South Africa, founded in substantial part on internationally guaranteed rights.
Unfortunately, in practice, the law does not deliver the benefits often ascribed to it.
Governments plead that they lack sufficient resources and that judicial power is
generally impotent to contradict them. For a balanced analysis of the judicial record in
South Africa, see Eric C. Christiansen, Adjudicating Non-Justiciable Rights: Socio-Economic
Rights and the South African Constitutional Court, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 321
(2007).
191. See U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, THE 2013 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT—THE RISE OF THE SOUTH: HUMAN PROGRESS IN A DIVERSE WORLD (2013),
available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2013_EN_complete.pdf.
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the developing world.”192 Indeed, the report identifies that
much of the poverty reduction that has taken place in the world,
allowing the MDG campaign to claim success meeting its
poverty-reduction, has come from a few nations in the South,
primarily the Peoples Republic of China, where about 500
million people have been lifted from poverty.193 Even if one
accepts fully the triumphalism in the report and discounts the
likelihood that economic success in these fast rising countries
might be temporary or was purchased to some substantial
degree at considerable cost to lower-tier workers in the older
developed economies, the implications for the place of
international law in the struggle against global misery are
profound. Put bluntly, if China, Brazil, India, and others among
the fast risers could succeed by engaging the current economic
model, why not the economic stragglers? The perceived success
or capacity to succeed of these relatively few countries may stand
as formidable barriers to those who would want to challenge
current economic orthodoxy on behalf of those unable or
prevented from competing.
The BRICS194 and wannabe-BRICS have seemingly validated
the legitimacy of the current international economic order. The
international economic rules of this order are stated in the
abstract. However, in international practice, the rules, rooted in
neo-liberal ideology, are enforced against those who require the
most support while those who control substantial economic
capacity have considerable freedom to experiment with their
economic policies consistent with their interests.195

192. Id. (stated on back cover of report).
193. Id.
194. BRICS began as BRIC, an acronym coined in 2001 by officials of the
investment bank, Goldman Sachs, to identify fast-growing countries—Brazil, Russia,
India, and China. South Africa was recently added to the group, hence BRICS. See
J.P.P., Why Is South Africa Included in the BRICS?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 29, 2013,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/03/economist-explainswhy-south-africa-brics. It seems that lately the BRICS have been demonstrating the
exaggerated piety associated with recent converts. They are now planning for their own
development bank. See Carol Matlack, Can the BRICS Have Their Own World Bank?,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 27, 2013, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/
2013-03-27/can-the-brics-have-their-own-world-bank; Gabriel Elizondo, BRICS Summit: A
(Mar.
29,
2013,
10:49
PM),
Perspective
from
Brazil,
ALJAZEERA
http://blogs.aljazeera.com/blog/americas/brics-summit-perspective-brazil.
195. See generally STIGLITZ, supra note 180.
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Internationally determined structural adjustment formulae, for
example, do not apply to the United States or the other major
economies in the world regardless of their circumstances. The
United States and a few privileged others can print money and
deficit fund economic growth even if the rules say otherwise.
The least among us have to conform and seek charity. Post
Second World War international human rights law’s potential
for economic emancipation at this point is severely
compromised.
CONCLUSION: BEYOND INTERNATIONAL LAW
To turn a phrase, law is legitimized politics-a Hydra-headed
process of social decision, involving persons at all levels and
from all walks of public and private life who, with authority
derived both explicitly and implicitly from community
consensus or expectation, and supported by formal and
informal sanction, effect those codes or standards of
everyday conduct by which we plan and go about our
lives.196

Richard Falk criticized international law and wrote of a
movement from inter-state law to a law of humanity. He
conceded that the “law of humanity is mainly in the dreaming
(or purely aspirational) phase.”197 Perhaps we should ask why
presume that the movement away from international law is
toward a law of some kind at all? What motivates the continuing
search for such certitude? What is behind this quest for
enduring solutions, in the face of horrendous realities and
irreconcilable interests? Are not human politics with its myriad
unfinished issues and conflicts good enough? Or does cloaking
politics with sprinklings of legal folderol make the
precariousness of the human condition more tolerable to
victims, victors, and activists? The Obama administration and
Secretary Kerry may decry the “moral obscenity” of using
chemical weapons and insist that the international community
must respond with force. But the “moral obscenity” of the
196. Weston, supra note 21, at 17.
197. Falk, World Order, supra note 14, at x.
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100,000 plus dead in the civil war and the millions more that die
every year from preventable conflicts, diseases, and hunger,
stand as an illuminating reminder of the incoherence and
incompetence of the order they are defending.
Over a century ago, the writer and great chronicler of
imperialism and its pretentions, Joseph Conrad, warned about
“the cruel futility of lives and of deaths thrown away in the vain
endeavor to attain an enduring solution of the problem.”198
Anyone who continues to inhabit a world where they must
depend on international law to feed them, to save them from
genocidal intent or nuclear holocaust, or to prevent the next
Syria, Bosnia, or is it Sierra Leone, from happening, has had a
privileged existence. The inadequacies of the post Second
World War international law regime in critical areas of human
existence are not too difficult to discern. Yet the regime of
international law still finds potency in the hearts and minds of
many. It is in the idea, the romance, a source of hope and a spur
to action for many, even as evidence of its incoherence and
functional incompetence abounds. H.L. Mencken said this
much about Mr. Kurtz, one of Conrad’s most arresting
creations: “Kurtz is at once the most abominable of rogues and
the most fantastic of dreamers. It is impossible to differentiate
between his vision and his crimes, though all that we look upon
as order in the universe stands between them.”199 Matched
against such dialectic, a call for deep re-examination or even
abandonment of faith coupled with resolute antipathy toward all
enduring solutions faces a difficult trajectory. But then one must
keep asking:
What happens to a dream deferred?
Does it dry up
like a raisin in the sun?
Or fester like a sore—
And then run?
Does it stink like rotten meat?

198.
199.

C ONRAD , supra note 117, at 221.
See H.L. MENCKEN, A BOOK OF PREFACES 39–40 (1917).
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Or crust and sugar over—
like a syrupy sweet?
Maybe it just sags
like a heavy load.
Or does it explode?200

Perhaps it is the explosion we are seeing around us
everyday as a long-suffering and fretful world grows tired of
waiting for law and other such solutions, long touted by experts,
to free them from the vagaries and horrors of everyday life.
Ordinary people experience an existence that comes down to
chance, greed, fear, and all the other emotions and desires that
have ineluctably driven diverse quotidian human actions. But,
these are what give us the great changes that had been wished
for generations before they occur every now and then. Albert
Camus, in his seminal work, The Plague, reminds us that the
most revolutionary act one can take in the midst of unrelenting
tragedy or horror is solidarity.201 Not grand theories, nor great
speeches, and not even the most detailed of plans.
There is no light lit by some exaggerated vision of
international law at the end of the tunnel of constant human
struggle. There is no certitude to be found in the law, especially
not one with the pedigree and experience of international law.
Grotian Moments do not resolve the fundamental absurdities of
life that unequal power and human desires have generated.
There are no final victories to be eternally policed by universal
law in our future. One may do just as well by embracing a life of
unrelenting struggles against pestilences of all sorts; struggles in
which individuals, like the protagonists of The Plague, will be
distinguished primarily by their capacities for empathy and
grace.

200.
201.

LANGSTON HUGHES, A DREAM DEFERRED (1951).
C AMUS, supra note 1, at 253–54.

